BGuthrie Photos: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: To the Brink

DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: To the Brink:

Bruce Guthrie Photos Home Page: [Click here] to go to Bruce Guthrie Photos home page.

Description of Pictures: About “To the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis”:
Secretly recorded White House tapes form the centerpiece of this exhibit marking the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Visitors listen in as the President and his advisers work furiously to avert a nuclear war. Original documents, artifacts, and photographs complement the tapes, breathing humanity into this milestone 20th-century event.

Same Event: Wait! There's more! Because I took too many pictures, photos from this event were divided among the following pages: [Display ALL photos on one page]:

2012_DC_Archives_Brink: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: To the Brink (129 photos from 2012)
2012_DC_Archives_BrinkPP_121010: Natl Archives -- Press Preview: To the Brink (Presentation) (51 photos from 2012)
2012_DC_Archives_BrinkPT_121010: Natl Archives -- Press Preview: To the Brink (Tour) (14 photos from 2012)

Recognize anyone? If you recognize specific folks (or other stuff) and I haven't labeled them, please identify them for the world. Click the little pencil icon

underneath the file name (just above the picture). Spammers need not apply.

Slide Show: Want to see the pictures as a slide show? [Slideshow]

Copyrights: All pictures were taken by amateur photographer Bruce Guthrie (me!) who retains copyright on them. Free for non-commercial use with attribution. See the [Creative Commons] definition of what this means. "Photos (c) Bruce Guthrie" is fine for attribution. (Commercial use folks including AI scrapers can of course contact me.) Feel free to use in publications and pages with attribution but you don't have permission to sell the photos themselves. A free copy of any printed publication using any photographs is requested. Descriptive text, if any, is from a mixture of sources, quite frequently from signs at the location or from official web sites; copyrights, if any, are retained by their original owners.

Help? The Medium (Email) links are for screen viewing and emailing. You'll want bigger sizes for printing. [Click here for additional help]

Share: Facebook Twitter Digg
[1] BRINK_121010_001.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[2] BRINK_121010_006.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[3] BRINK_121010_012.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[4] BRINK_121010_015.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[5] BRINK_121010_022.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[6] BRINK_121010_026.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[7] BRINK_121010_031.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[8] BRINK_121010_036.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[9] BRINK_121010_040.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[10] BRINK_121010_055.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[11] BRINK_121010_059.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[12] BRINK_121010_063.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[13] BRINK_121010_066.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[14] BRINK_121010_082.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[15] BRINK_121010_086.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[16] BRINK_121010_093.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[17] BRINK_121010_097.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[18] BRINK_121010_101.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[19] BRINK_121010_105.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[20] BRINK_121010_109.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[21] BRINK_121010_115.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[22] BRINK_121010_122.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[23] BRINK_121010_127.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[24] BRINK_121010_130.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[25] BRINK_121010_135.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[26] BRINK_121010_142.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[27] BRINK_121010_153.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[28] BRINK_121010_156.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[29] BRINK_121010_163.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[30] BRINK_121010_166.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[31] BRINK_121010_174.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[32] BRINK_121010_181.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[33] BRINK_121010_188.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[34] BRINK_121010_194.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[35] BRINK_121010_198.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[36] BRINK_121010_201.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[37] BRINK_121010_204.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[38] BRINK_121010_212.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[39] BRINK_121010_215.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[40] BRINK_121010_225.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[41] BRINK_121010_230.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[42] BRINK_121010_238.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[43] BRINK_121010_241.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[44] BRINK_121010_244.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[45] BRINK_121010_250.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[46] BRINK_121010_255.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[47] BRINK_121010_266.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[48] BRINK_121010_273.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[49] BRINK_121010_276.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[50] BRINK_121010_279.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[51] BRINK_121010_282.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[52] BRINK_121010_286.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[53] BRINK_121010_290.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[54] BRINK_121010_295.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[55] BRINK_121010_303.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[56] BRINK_121010_309.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[57] BRINK_121010_316.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[58] BRINK_121010_324.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[59] BRINK_121010_332.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[60] BRINK_121010_338.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[61] BRINK_121010_345.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[62] BRINK_121010_353.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[63] BRINK_121010_363.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[64] BRINK_121010_369.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[65] BRINK_121010_372.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[66] BRINK_121010_377.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[67] BRINK_121010_384.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[68] BRINK_121010_388.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[69] BRINK_121010_392.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[70] BRINK_121010_400.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[71] BRINK_121010_408.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[72] BRINK_121010_411.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[73] BRINK_121010_417.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[74] BRINK_121010_423.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[75] BRINK_121010_426.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[76] BRINK_121010_432.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[77] BRINK_121010_438.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[78] BRINK_121010_443.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[79] BRINK_121010_447.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[80] BRINK_121010_451.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[81] BRINK_121010_457.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[82] BRINK_121010_471.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[83] BRINK_121010_475.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[84] BRINK_121010_478.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[85] BRINK_121010_482.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[86] BRINK_121010_488.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[87] BRINK_121010_494.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[88] BRINK_121010_497.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[89] BRINK_121010_500.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[90] BRINK_121010_503.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[91] BRINK_121010_506.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[92] BRINK_121010_509.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[93] BRINK_121010_513.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[94] BRINK_121010_518.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[95] BRINK_121010_522.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[96] BRINK_121010_527.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[97] BRINK_121010_537.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[98] BRINK_121010_544.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[99] BRINK_121010_549.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[100] BRINK_121010_553.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[101] BRINK_121010_558.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[102] BRINK_121010_564.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[103] BRINK_121010_577.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[104] BRINK_121010_581.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[105] BRINK_121010_584.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[106] BRINK_121010_588.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[107] BRINK_121010_592.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[108] BRINK_121010_597.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[109] BRINK_121010_601.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[110] BRINK_121010_605.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[111] BRINK_121010_609.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[112] BRINK_121010_614.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[113] BRINK_121010_621.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[114] BRINK_121010_624.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[115] BRINK_121010_627.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[116] BRINK_121010_630.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[117] BRINK_121010_635.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[118] BRINK_121010_639.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[119] BRINK_121010_642.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[120] BRINK_121010_647.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[121] BRINK_121010_651.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[122] BRINK_121010_653.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[123] BRINK_121010_657.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[124] BRINK_121010_662.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[125] BRINK_121010_666.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[126] BRINK_121010_669.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[127] BRINK_121010_673.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)	[128] BRINK_121010_678.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)
[129] BRINK_121010_682.JPG Medium (Email) (Bigger?)

Specific picture descriptions: Photos above with "i" icons next to the bracketed sequence numbers (e.g. "[1] ") are described as follows:
1. BRINK_121010_012.JPG: Chairs used by President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev at the American Embassy residence in Vienna, Austria, July 3, 1961: The two leaders met at the US Embassy residence on June 3. President Kennedy later purchased these chairs from the State Department for their historic significance and had them shipped to the White House; he intended to donate them to his Presidential Library, where they now reside.
2. BRINK_121010_015.JPG: Meeting Face-to-Face: The only time President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev formally met face-to-face was a summit meeting held in Vienna, Austria, June 3-4, 1961. The meetings were tough and contentious, covering a range of issues, both strategic and ideological. Khrushchev's combative posture took President Kennedy by surprise. Neither side yielded a point, and Khrushchev left Kennedy with an ultimatum the signaled a new crisis over the future of Berlin, Hitler's former capital that had been divided between East and West after World War II. Nevertheless, the summit provided an opportunity for both leaders to meet and size up each other as a negotiating adversary. As a result of Krushshev's intransigence in Vienna, JFK authorized that the launch sites for the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Turkey became fully operational -- that is, capable of launching missiles that could reach the USSR in just minutes.
3. BRINK_121010_031.JPG: To the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis: It was a close call -- maybe the closest call in human history. For two weeks in October 1962, the world teetered on the edge of thermonuclear war and the end of civilization as we know it. Earlier that fall, the Soviet Union, under orders from Premier Nikita Khrushchev, began secretly to deploy a nuclear strike force in Cuba, just 90 miles from the United States, with missiles that could reach most major U.S. cities in less than 5 minutes. President John F. Kennedy said the missiles would not be tolerated, and insisted on their removal. Khrushchev refused. The stand-off nearly caused a nuclear exchange and is remembered in this country as the Cuban Missile Crisis. For 13 days, the fate of the world hung in the balance. For all his muscular, anti-communist rhetoric, the President's response was remarkably restrained. Under unimaginable pressure -- as the Soviets raced to complete construction of the missile sites -- the President refused to be rushed. He conducted the negotiations with discipline and delicacy, balancing cold resolve with pragmatic statesmanship. He could not accept the missiles, but neither would he force the hand of an impulsive opponent into a rash response. And on October 28, 1962, with the world's mightiest military forces bristling with anticipation, and events spinning out of control, Khrushchev suddenly relented. The missile sites, he announced, would be dismantled immediately. The peaceful resolution of the crisis is considered to be one of President Kennedy's greatest achievements. "To the Brink" is a look back at the crisis from the 50-year mark. It is drawn mainly from U.S. sources and presents a U.S. viewpoint. Pieces of the story that appear hazy now may come into sharper focus over time; others that are now clear will blur as the episode recedes further into history. And perhaps the most intriguing questions of all, which concern the mystery of human behavior, will remain unanswered -- known only to the men who looked into the abyss of a nuclear catastrophe, and then stepped back.
4. BRINK_121010_055.JPG: "The Communist empire... which knows only one party and one belief ... suppresses free debate, and free elections, and free newspapers and free books and free trade unions -- and ... builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizen prisoners." -- September 25, 1961 "I think that anybody who looks at the fatality lists on atomic weapons, and realizes that the Communists have a completely twisted view of the United States, and that we don't comprehend them, that is what makes life in the sixties hazardous." -- December 17, 1962 John Fitzgerald Kennedy
5. BRINK_121010_059.JPG: Secret Recordings at the White House: The President mobilized a group of advisers to help navigate the crisis. For two weeks, they met almost continuously, sorting through the confusion of ever-changing reports and intelligence. With the President guiding the discussions, they argued heatedly -- passionately -- over the best course of action. As they struggled to make sense of events unfolding around the globe, and the world moved closer to a possible nuclear confrontation, the President made his decisions, imposing them, when necessary, on his advisers. Unbeknownst to almost all of the participants, JFK recorded these White House meetings. Excerpts from the 43 hours of secret recordings related to the Cuban Missile Crisis are presented in the gallery and form the centerpiece of this exhibit. The tapes are preserved by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston, Massachusetts.
6. BRINK_121010_063.JPG: High Alert! DEFCON-3 While millions of Americans listened spellbound to the President's address, the US military was roused from DEFCON-5, a peacetime military posture (defense condition), to a heightened alert. At DEFCON-3, the country's fleet of nuclear bombers were dispersed and made ready to be launched within 15 minutes of an order from the President. On October 24, the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the nation's nuclear arsenal, moved to DEFCON-2, more than 1,400 US bombers loaded with nuclear weapons were on airborne alert, with one-eighth of the bombers in the air at all times -- some ready to strike targets inside the Soviet Union. More than 130 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), deployed in bunkers and silos across the United States, were also ready for launching. The nation's massive military machine would remain at this maximum state of military readiness for the next 30 days.
7. BRINK_121010_066.JPG: Cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, announcing the military alert, DEFCON-3, October 23, 1962.
8. BRINK_121010_082.JPG: Nikita S. Khrushchev, Moscow, April 12, 1955: Nikita S. Khrushchev was Premier of the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He came from a peasant background and -- with little formal education -- rose through the ranks of the Communist Party during the regime of Joseph Stalin, whose bloody purges claimed millions of lives. Khrushchev successfully conspired to succeed Stalin as Soviet leader after his death in 1953. Although Khrushchev introduced reforms and put a new face on the Communist Party, he relied on many of the strong-arm tactics to retain power. In Cuba, Khrushchev saw an opportunity to gain a foothold for Marxism-Leninsm in Latin America and thus strengthen the worldwide Communist movement.
9. BRINK_121010_086.JPG: Fidel Castro, Havana, January 10, 1959 Photograph by Lester Cole. The illegitimate son of a wealthy sugar planter and household servant, Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, at age 32, after leading a rebel army that toppled the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Subsequently, Castro consolidated power in his own hands, postponed the free elections and reforms promised by the revolution, cracked down on all political dissent, and eventually declared Cuba a socialist state. Thousands of Cubans were executed between 1959 and 1962; hundreds of thousands more fled the country. Castro actively sought the support and protection of the Soviet Union, openly aligned with the policies of the Soviet Union and eventually became a Soviet ally in the Cold War.
10. BRINK_121010_097.JPG: Overtaking the Soviet Union: The Space Race and the Arms Race: During the 1960 Presidential race, Kennedy had campaigned hard on the issue of American strength. The power and prestige of the United States was slipping, he had warned. The Soviet Union had surged ahead of the United States with spectacular achievements in space, and there was a debate within the US intelligence community and concern in Congress as to whether the Soviet Union held the advantage over the United States in strategic weapons. But by 1961, the United States had caught up to the Soviet Union in the space race, and intelligence revealed that it was the United States -- not the Soviet Union -- that held the advantage in the strategic arms race.
11. BRINK_121010_101.JPG: "We have many times more nuclear power than any other nation on earth... It is essential to the defense of the Free World that we maintain this relative position." -- President John F. Kennedy, November 2, 1961
12. BRINK_121010_105.JPG: The Soviets Send Missiles to Cuba: "There will be no big reaction from the U.S. side." -- Soviet defense minister on the expected U.S. response to the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba In January 1961, Khrushchev cited the Cuban Revolution as evidence "of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world scale." But the Caribbean island was both an asset and a vulnerability for the Soviet Union: Cuba's proximity to the United States made it well positioned to be a Soviet military base, but its distance from Moscow meant that Cuba would be hard for the Soviets to defend. In spring 1962, Khrushchev gambled that the Soviet Union could secretly ship nuclear missiles to Cuba and deceive President Kennedy long enough so that the missiles could become operational. Historians still debate what ultimately prompted Khrushshev to take this huge risk. In his memoirs, Khrushchev gave two reasons, one defensive and one offensive: the defense of the Castro regime in Cuba, and a desire to put pressure on the Kennedy administration by dramatically changing the strategic balance of power. Fragmentary minutes of the Presidium (the Soviet Union's executive governing body), released only in 2002, suggest that initially, at least, the main reason was offensive. On May 20, a Soviet delegation traveled to Cuba to propose the deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuban officials. On May 30, Castro, who was surprised by the offer, approved it.
13. BRINK_121010_109.JPG: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev with Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, New York, September 23, 1960.
14. BRINK_121010_115.JPG: Tandburg tape recorder, ca. 1960, similar to the one installed by the Secret Service, as directed by the President, to tape conversations in the Cabinet Room and Oval Office.
15. BRINK_121010_122.JPG: A meeting of the Ex Comm in the Cabinet Room, October 29, 1962: The switch to turn the recorder on was installed on the underside of the conference table in front of the President's chair; the microphones were on the wall directly behind the President's chair in spaces that once held light fixtures.
16. BRINK_121010_127.JPG: White House Secret Taping System: During the summer of 1962, President Kennedy asked Secret Service Agent Robert Bouck to install a secret tape recording system inside the White House. Two reel-to-reel machines, similar to this one, were installed in the basement of the White House West Wing. Concealed microphones were placed inside the President's Oval Office and the Cabinet Room. The President could activate the recording device with controls that were, like the microphones, concealed. The taping system in the White House recorded nearly 250 hours of White House meetings, including most of the ones that took place -- almost continuously -- throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis. The tapes provide entree to the high level secret meetings that would determine the U.S. response to the Soviet deployment of nuclear missile sites in Cuba. Listeners hear the President's advisory group reacting to events in real time and can discern the moments in which the President makes pivotal decisions. There is no evidence that reveals the President's purpose in creating these tapes.
17. BRINK_121010_130.JPG: A Threat 90 Miles from Home: "This nation... must take an even closer and more realistic look at the menace of external communist intervention and domination in Cuba. The American people are not complacent from Iron Curtain tanks and planes less than 90 miles from our shores." -- President John F. Kennedy, April 20, 1961 The United States watched the Cuban Revolution with growing concern. Relations between the two countries deteriorated as the Cuban government expropriated U.S. properties, repressed all dissent, escalated its anti-American rhetoric, and built an alliance with the Soviet Union. "Cuba appears to be in the process of falling under the domination of International Communism," warned the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, and that would present "a direct threat to the security of the United States." In March 1960, President Eisenhower approved a $4.4 million program whose purpose was to "bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the interest of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the United States." President Kennedy continued and expanded that program, which was ultimately codenamed "Operation Mongoose."
18. BRINK_121010_135.JPG: "Large artillery pieces are shown firing on Cuban rebels as they invade a beachhead in Cuba," April 1961. On April 17, 1961, a 1,400-man invasion force of anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Brigade 2506, landed at the Bay of Pigs beach on the south coast of Cuba. Overwhelmed by a counterattack of Castro's armed forces, the invasion force was crushed two days later. More than 100 men were killed, and nearly 1,100 men were taken prisoner and held in captivity in Cuba for close to two years.
19. BRINK_121010_142.JPG: President Kennedy's reading copy of his address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, April 20, 1961, selected pages. Publicly, President Kennedy took responsibility for the invasion's failure and spoke of the lessons to be learned from "this sobering episode." Privately, he wondered aloud to a close adviser, "How could I have been so off base? ... All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?"
20. BRINK_121010_153.JPG: The Bay of Pigs Invasion: The Bay of Pigs invasion was the failed attempt by U.S.-backed Cuban exiles to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. In March 1960, the Eisenhower administration authorized a CIA program to train Cuban exiles as guerrillas. In the final weeks of the Eisenhower administration, the number of exiles under CIA training in Guatemala grew, and the goal became a large-scale invasion. President Kennedy approved the policy but had doubts about the operation. He wanted it to succeed without a U.S. military invasion and without revealing the U.S. role in organizing the exiles. These objectives proved unrealistic. The operation was a disaster. Although it was not clear that the plan would ever have worked, President Kennedy's assumption that he would cut the number of planned attacks by U.S.-supplied airplanes to hide the hand of the United States ensured that Castro's air force could harass the invading Cuban exiles.
21. BRINK_121010_156.JPG: Program review and plan of action for Operation Mongoose, by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, February 20, 1962, selected pages. Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, acted as chief of operations for the SGA and was the author of this paper. On February 26, 1962, the SGA decided to reduce the scale of the plan set forth here.
22. BRINK_121010_163.JPG: "Operation Mongoose": After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA's covert action plans for Cuba would be reviewed by a committee of the National Security Council, known as the Special Group Augmented (SGA). Under the guidance of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President's brother, the SGA directed "Operation Mongoose," which grew to have an annual budget of $50 million and a corps of some 400 agents engaged in a variety of covert operations, including attempts on the life of Fidel Castro.
23. BRINK_121010_166.JPG: San Cristobal No.1 , MRBM Site, October 14, 1962: This is one of 928 images taken during an aerial photographic reconnaissance mission flown over Cuba on Sunday, October 14, 1962. On October 15, analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center concluded that the photographs showed evidence of Soviet missile site construction in Cuba and conveyed their findings to McGeorge Bundy, the President's National Security Adviser. Early the following morning, Bundy delivered the news and the photos to the President in his bedroom. Wearing his bathrobe, reviewing the newspapers and working papers in preparation for a normal workday, the President learned of the imminent threat to the nation's security. The presence and size of the missiles was presumptive of nuclear capability. He called a meeting of his foreign policy advisers for 11:45 that morning. Months later, when JFK asked Bundy why he waited before delivering this news, Bundy explained: "I decided that a quiet evening and a night of sleep were the best preparation you could have."
24. BRINK_121010_174.JPG: Map of Cuba used and annotated by President Kennedy when he was first briefed by the CIA on the Cuban Missile Crisis. The President notes the location of the missile sites on this map.
25. BRINK_121010_198.JPG: Sending Soviet Missiles to Cuba: A Chronology: * Spring 1962: Khrushchev conceives of a plan to secretly deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. The Presidium (the Soviet Union's executive governing body) approves Khrushchev's proposal. The plan is eventually codenamed Anadyr, the site of a strategic air base in Siberia from which Soviet bombers could reach the United States. * May 30, 1962: Cuban leadership accepts Soviet offer of the missiles: Castro later proposes that the deployment be publicly announced -- not carried out in secret -- but Khrushchev insists on the operation's secrecy. * Summer 1962: U.S. intelligence detects Soviet military shipments to Cuba. * September 4, 1962: President Kennedy issues a statement warning the Soviet Union that "the gravest issues would arise," if they were to deploy weapons "with significant offensive capability." * September 7, 1962: President Kennedy calls up 150,000 army reservists for one year of active duty. * Throughout September, 1962: The Soviet Union repeatedly denies the deployment of offensive weapons. Meanwhile the United States detects more state-of-the-art Soviet defensive Surface-to-Air-Missiles (SAMs) in Cuba and after September 10 decides to limit the amount of time any U-2 flew over Cuba to lessen the risk of one being shot down. * October 4, 1962: The first nuclear warheads arrive in Cuba. * October 1962: The Soviet Union continues to deny the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba. * October 9, 1962: U.S. intensifies surveillance flights over Cuba in an effort to obtain evidence of nuclear missile sites there. * October 14, 1962: A U-2 flight flies over the western end of Cuba for the first time since September 5 and photographs activity in San Christobal, a town in western Cuba. * October 15, 1962: Analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) find evidence in the photographs of a medium-range ballistic missile site. * October 16, 1962: The evidence is presented to President Kennedy.
26. BRINK_121010_201.JPG: A Team of Advisors: The "Ex Comm": Presented with photographic evidence of the missile sites in Cuba, President Kennedy immediately assembled a group of advisers to help formulate a response. On October 22, President Kennedy formalized the role of his core advisory group, establishing the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which became known as the "Ex Comm." Many other advisors and experts participated in the meetings intermittently throughout the crisis. The President served as Chairman of the Committee. Pictured below are the Ex Comm members listed by the President in his Action Memo of October 22
27. BRINK_121010_204.JPG: National Security Action memorandum 196, establishing an Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 22, 1962: On October 22, President Kennedy formalized the role of his advisory group. Signing this memo he established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, known as the "Ex Comm" for short.
28. BRINK_121010_215.JPG: President Kennedy's doodle notes, October 1962: President Kennedy had a habit of jotting down words, notes, and doodles during meetings. After the meetings adjourned, the President's secretary collected and filed the notes, which are now preserved as part of the President's paper. Transcription: Hard information John McCone [Director of Central Intelligence] Sunday October 14th 5 days Week or ten days Medium range ballistic 12 intermediate range Ballistic missiles Dem [?] line
29. BRINK_121010_225.JPG: Photographs of the missile site construction underway at San Cristobal, Cuba, October 14, 1962. On Tuesday, October 16, intelligence and photographic experts briefed the Ex Comm about the photographs. Robert Kennedy later recalled that meeting: "[The experts] told us that if we looked carefully, we could see there was a missile base being constructed... I, for one, had to take their word for it. I examined the pictures carefully, and what I saw appeared to be no more than the clearing of a field... I was relieved to hear later that this was the same reaction of virtually everyone at the meeting, including President Kennedy."
30. BRINK_121010_238.JPG: Note handwritten by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy during the October 16, 1962 meeting, facsimile: I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor. Among the options under discussion was a surprise military strike against the missile sites. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara later wrote that JFK opposed this tactic, in part, because it was "contrary to our traditions and ideals, and an act of brutality for which the world would never forgive us." Some compared a U.S. surprise strike in Cuba to Japan's December 7, 1951, surprise attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor, ordered by Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. George Ball, Undersecretary of State, said "... if we act without a warning, that's like Pearl Harbor. ... It's the kind of conduct that one might expect of the Soviet Union. It is not conduct that one expects of the United States."
31. BRINK_121010_241.JPG: President Kennedy at his desk in the Oval Office, March 1961 Photograph by Jacques Lowe Following a late night meeting with his advisers that took place in the White House residence on October 18, the President walked over to the Oval Office, where he recorded a summary of the day's discussion.
32. BRINK_121010_244.JPG: ... During the course of the day, opinions had obviously switched from the advantages of a first strike on the missile sites and on Cuban aviation to a blockade... The consensus was that we should go ahead with the blockade beginning on Sunday night. Originally we should begin by blockading Soviets against the shipment of additional offensive capacity, [and] that we could tighten the blockade as the situation requires, I was most anxious that we not have to announce state of war existing, because it would obviously be bad to have the word go out that we were having a war rather than that it was a limited blockade for a limited purpose. -- President Kennedy, October 18, 1962
33. BRINK_121010_250.JPG: "I therefore believe that the survival of our nation demands the prompt elimination of the offensive weapons now in Cuba... I recognize fully the public opinion difficulties involved in a surprise attack but believe that, if no other effective course is available, they must be accepted rather than run the grave risk to our national security involved in allowing the weapons to remain in Cuba." -- Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, to President Kennedy, ca October 17, 1962 "... it should be clear as a pikestaff that the U.S. was, is and will be ready to negotiate the elimination of bases and anything else; that it is they who have upset the precarious balance in the world in arrogant disregard of your warnings... and that we have no choice except to restore that balance, i.e., blackmail and intimidation never, negotiation and sanity always." -- Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to President Kennedy, October 17, 1962 "I am persuaded that the disadvantages of an air strike are too great for us to undertake. I have, therefore, concluded that the blockade plan -- while by no means wholly satisfactory -- is the course we should follow." -- George W. Ball, Undersecretary of State, ca. October 18, 1962
34. BRINK_121010_255.JPG: Map prepared by the CIA showing areas and cities within range of nuclear missiles launched from Cuba, October 1962: A medium-range ballistic missile had a range of roughly 1,100 nautical miles, and an intermediate-range ballistic missile, roughly 2,200 nautical miles. Based on those estimates, some two-thirds of the United States mainland would be endangered by Soviet missiles.
35. BRINK_121010_266.JPG: Synopsis of President's speech announcing U.S. military airstrikes, not dated, not delivered: This synopsis, drafted for the President while several courses of action were under discussion, includes an announcement of U.S. military air strikes in Cuba, as well as a call for a summit and a pledge that the United States would withdraw its nuclear missiles based on Turkey.
36. BRINK_121010_295.JPG: Life Magazine, September 15, 1961: The cover story of this issue was "How You Can Survive Fallout -- 97 out of 100 people can be saved... Detail plans for building shelters." This issue also included a letter from President Kennedy reminding readers that "nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war are facts of life we cannot ignore," and urging them to "read and consider seriously the contents of this issue of LIFE."
37. BRINK_121010_303.JPG: Summary of Objections to Airstrike Option and Advantages of Blockade Option, October 20, 1962: After four days and countless hours of discussion, Special Counsel Ted Sorensen, whose initials appear at the upper right-hand corner of the page, prepared this summary statement, recommending the blockade option over the air strike option. He gave it to the President when he arrived back at the White House Saturday afternoon.
38. BRINK_121010_309.JPG: Transcription: Slight upper respiratory 1 degree temperature Weather raw & rainy Recommended return to Washington Cancelled Schedule
39. BRINK_121010_316.JPG: Preparing for Nuclear War: "I got the conclusion that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm." -- John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, after a briefing on the nation's ability to prepare for and withstand a Soviet nuclear attack, October 23, 1962 In the summer and fall of 1961, as tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated, President Kennedy announced a massive program to build and stock fallout shelters across the country: "In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved -- if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families -- and to our country." But after consulting most closely with his science advisers, JFK became less confident in the ability to dramatically limit casualties with an extensive system of fallout shelters.
40. BRINK_121010_324.JPG: Memo from Tazewell Shepard, the President's Naval Aide, regarding the "White House Emergency Plan," October 1962: The White House Emergency Plan provided for the continuity of government operations in the event of an attack or natural disaster. Should evacuation of the White House become necessary, President Kennedy had selected key officials who were to be relocated with him and remain with him during the crisis. Those officials selected to stay with the President received a memo, an instruction card, and a vehicle pass to help them to "relocate with the President." This memo and the vehicle pass were sent to Dave Powers, Special Assistant to the President and one of his closest friends.
41. BRINK_121010_332.JPG: Vehicle Pass for Civil Defense Emergency Use
42. BRINK_121010_338.JPG: Quarantine Proclamation: Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, signed October 23, 1962, selected pages: At 7pm, on October 23, President Kennedy signed this document, authorizing the naval quarantine of Cuba. It would go into effect at 10am the next morning. The quarantine line would be a 500-mile radius from the eastern tip of Cuba. A legal expert at the State Department had suggested that the term "quarantine" would be less belligerent in its connotations, since a blockade was regarded under international law as an act of war.
43. BRINK_121010_345.JPG: Pen used to sign the Proclamation: Often, the President would sign a milestone document with many pens, and then give them away as mementos. But he used only this one pen to sign the quarantine order, and he slipped it into his pocket immediate after, saying "I am going to keep this one."
44. BRINK_121010_353.JPG: President Kennedy signing the Quarantine Proclamation, October 23, 1962 Photograph by Abbie Rowe
45. BRINK_121010_363.JPG: President Kennedy's notes with the word "euphoria," not dated: During a discussion on October 25 about 14 Soviet ships that had turned around, President Kennedy cautioned against being overly optimistic: "I don't want a sense of euphoria passing around."
46. BRINK_121010_372.JPG: P2V Neptune US patrol plane flying over a Soviet freighter during the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962
47. BRINK_121010_377.JPG: "Eyeball to Eyeball," October 24, 1962: This map illustrates the reversal of the 2 Soviet ships, the Kimovsk and the Yuri Gagarin, which had been targeted for interception by the aircraft carrier USS Essex on the first day of the quarantine. When the Ex Comm learned that the Soviet ships had reversed course, Secretary of State Dean Rusk turned to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and said, "We're eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked." In fact, the Kimovsk had turned around the previous day, but the Ex Comm did not receive that information until Wednesday morning. Illustration by David Lindroth, published in One Minute to Midnight by Michael Dobbs
48. BRINK_121010_384.JPG: What They Didn't Know: "We're going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all -- we will not disgrace our Navy!" -- Soviet submarine Captain Valentin Savitsky, giving the order to arm a nuclear-tipped torpedo, October 27, 1962 Unbeknownst to the Ex Comm and the US Navy, each of the Soviet submarines was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo. Soviet Captain VP Orlov of the Soviet submarine B-59 was in charge of the vessel's radio intelligence on October 27 when the US Navy dropped depth charges in an effort to force the submarine to the surface. He later recalled that the temperature soared to over 100 degrees, and he described the episode: "If felt like sitting in a metal barrel with someone hitting it with a sledgehammer... It was unbearably stuffy... the duty officers ... were falling like dominoes ...We thought -- that's it -- the end. ... Savitsky [the submarine's commander] became furious. He summoned the officer who was assigned to the nuclear torpedo, and ordered him to assemble it to battle readiness... But we did not fire the nuclear torpedo -- Savitsky was able to rein in his wrath." After hours of being subjected to the "depth charges," the Soviet submarine surfaced. Although the Soviet submarine commander was not authorized to launch a nuclear-tipped torpedo without a direct order from Moscow, the incident might possibly have triggered a nuclear confrontation at sea.
49. BRINK_121010_388.JPG: Secret Correspondence: JFK and Khrushchev: The two leaders exchanged a series of secret messages as the crisis unfolded, using secure diplomatic channels to communicate directly. Messages were hand-carried, ciphered, deciphered, and translated in a process that created lag times of up to 12 hours. With the world on the brink of a nuclear cataclysm, the two leaders could not communicate in real time.
50. BRINK_121010_392.JPG: Working draft of a message from President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev, advising him to comply with the quarantine, October 23, 1962: The draft is annotated with notes by Charles Johnson, a senior member of the National Security Staff. During a 6pm, meeting in the Cabinet Room, less than 24 hours before the quarantine would go into effect, the Ex Comm worked on this draft and approved the final text, with a few revisions. It was immediately sent to the US Embassy in Moscow to be delivered to Khrushchev.
51. BRINK_121010_400.JPG: Premier Khrushchev's response to the President's message, October 24, 1962: Shown here is the official translation furnished by the State Department.
52. BRINK_121010_408.JPG: Khrushchev's "Knot of War" Message: Although major hostilities at the quarantines line off the coast of Cuba had thus far been avoided, work on the missile sites continued. On Friday, October 26, Khrushchev received intelligence information indicating that the US would begin an attack on Cuba within the next two days. He dictated a long and rambling message to President Kennedy signaling that there could be a diplomatic way out of the crisis: he seemed to suggest that if the US were to agree not to invade Cuba, the missiles could be removed.
53. BRINK_121010_411.JPG: Message from Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy, suggesting a diplomatic solution to the crisis, October 26, 1962: Shown here is the English translation, furnished by the State Department.
54. BRINK_121010_417.JPG: Message in Russian, from Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962, pages 1 and 9
55. BRINK_121010_423.JPG: On the Brink of Catastrophe: On October 27, the crisis started spiraling out of control. Events of the previous nine days had unleashed forces that were moving beyond the reach of the only two men who could control them. The day is remembered as "Black Saturday," because of two separate incidents. Taking off from a US Air Force Base in Alaska, an American pilot strayed into Soviet airspace. The United States later explained that the pilot had lost his bearings while on an air sampling mission over the North Pole. The incident could easily have been interpreted by the Soviets as a provocation -- a preliminary reconnaissance mission preceding a nuclear attack on Soviet soil. Almost simultaneously, an American U-2 plane was shot down over the village of Veguitas by order of two Soviet officers on the ground in Cuba. The pilot died instantly. The Ex Comm assumed -- mistakenly -- that the order had come from Moscow and interpreted it as a deliberate escalation. The President was urged to order a retaliatory strike against the surface-to-air-missile (SAM) site that had launched the missile; but in a show of restraint, he decided to wait, averting an incident that might have escalated into a nuclear exchange.
56. BRINK_121010_426.JPG: Charles Maultsby's mission to North Pole, October 27, 1962: Illustration by David Lindroth, published in One Minute to Midnight by Michael Dobbs. Capt. Charles Maultsby, a 36-year-old veteran of the Korean War, was the pilot on this flight. This map shows his planned route from the Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and back, in relation to his actual route, which took him over Soviet territory. Soviet fighter aircraft from two Siberian airfields, Pevek and Anadyr, scrambled to intercept Maultsby's plane; two U.S. fighter jets, armed with nuclear-tipped missiles, also scrambled to guide Maultsby back to Alaska, where he landed safely at Kotzebue, the site of a US military radar station.
57. BRINK_121010_432.JPG: Capt. Charles Maultsby, ca 1960
58. BRINK_121010_438.JPG: Notes of Thomas A. Parrott, CIA Officer assigned to the White House, on the U-2 plane that strayed into Soviet airspace, not dated. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara learned of the incident at 1:40pm, more than an hour-and-a-half after Maultsby crossed the Soviet border; McNamara immediately informed the President by phone.
59. BRINK_121010_443.JPG: "It is not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber?" -- Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 28, 1962 "The pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory... I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence." -- President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev, October 28, 1962
60. BRINK_121010_447.JPG: Wreckage of Major Anderson's plane, not dated
61. BRINK_121010_451.JPG: Maj. Rudolf Anderson, Jr.: Maj. Rudolf Anderson Jr., a US Air Force pilot, was the only combat casualty of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile during a reconnaissance flight over Cuba on October 27, 1962, approximately 10:22am local time. Major Anderson had piloted a U-2 mission on October 15 that produced some of the early photographic evidence of the Soviet deployment of missiles. He was posthumously awarded the first Air Force Cross, which cited his "extraordinary heroism ... during this period of great national crisis."
62. BRINK_121010_457.JPG: Draft of President Kennedy's letter to Jane Anderson, widow of Maj. Rudolf Anderson, October 28, 1962: After reading this draft, President Kennedy wrote the following lines: "Your husband's mission was of the greatest importance but I know how deeply you must feel his loss. Mrs. Anderson gave birth to the couple's third child 7-1/2 months later.
63. BRINK_121010_471.JPG: President Kennedy's notes as he watched the UN Security Council meeting, October 25, 1962: President Kennedy's secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, annotated these notes.
64. BRINK_121010_475.JPG: The President Responds to Khrushchev's Messages: Khrushchev's letter of October 26 proposed a deal in which the Soviets would dismantle the Cuban sites if the US would pledge not to invade Cuba and to lift the quarantine. Before the Ex Comm could compose a response, a different proposal came in over the newswires: Premier Khrushchev told President Kennedy yesterday he would withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba if the US withdrew its rockets from Turkey. Against the counsel of nearly all his advisers, the President saw in this second proposal a way out of the crisis, and insisted on giving it every possible consideration. Ultimately, the United States responded to Khrushchev's proposals in two parts: the first part was President Kennedy's message to Premier Khrushchev, shown in this case, which reached the State Department at 8:05pm on the evening of October 27. The second part of the message was conveyed orally when Attorney General Robert F Kennedy personally handed the letter to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at 7:45 that evening. A summary of that meeting is in the case at left.
65. BRINK_121010_478.JPG: President Kennedy's response to Premier Khrushchev's proposal, essentially agreeing to the Premier's earlier proposal, October 27, 1962
66. BRINK_121010_494.JPG: Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Attorney General, describing his October 27 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, October 30, 1962: This memo is Robert Kennedy's account of the historic encounter. The sentence on page 3 that has a line drawn through it relates to the removal of the missiles in Turkey. There is no evidence to tell us by whom or for what purpose it was crossed out. But it may well reflect the administration's concern for secrecy on this question. Robert Kennedy was instructed to warn Dobrynin that any disclosure of the secret agreement would render it null and void.
67. BRINK_121010_497.JPG: Secret agreement regarding US missiles in Turkey, October 27, 1962: Unbeknownst to at least half of the Ex Comm, President Kennedy authorized Attorney General Robert Kennedy to convey a willingness on the part of the United States to remove the missiles in Turkey, if pressed on the matter -- but that part of the agreement would have to remain secret. Shortly after taking office in 1961, President Kennedy had expressed an interest in removing the missiles in Turkey; they were all but obsolete. But there was concern that doing so under pressure of the current crisis could be interpreted as a betrayal of the US alliance with the Turks.
68. BRINK_121010_513.JPG: Khrushchev's Decision-Making Process: The US response to the missile sites -- President Kennedy's October 22 message to the nation and the military mobilization -- alarmed the Soviets. In a gross miscalculation, Khrushchev had assumed that the United States would tolerate the presence of the missiles in Cuba. On Thursday, October 25, the Soviet Union decided to seek a diplomatic way out of the crisis -- they would remove the missile sites in Cuba. On Friday, October 26, having read intelligence reports about an imminent US invasion of Cuba, Khrushchev dictated his long message to President Kennedy offering to remove the missiles in exchange for a US pledge not to invade Cuba. The message was conveyed through official diplomatic channels in a process that took nearly 12 hours. Soon after, Khrushchev began to have second thoughts. He did not believe that President Kennedy would resort to force. As the Soviet leader's son, Sergei Khrushchev, later recalled: "Father decided to try to change horses in midstream... now it was all logical: the [US] base in Turkey in exchange for the [Soviet] base in Cuba." Quickly, Khrushchev dictated another letter demanding removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Aware of the lag time in official diplomatic channels, he ordered the letter to be read over the air by Radio Moscow. It was broadcast as the Ex Comm was deliberating his original proposal. The View From Cuba: In Cuba, the US reconnaissance overflights were believed to be a prelude to an all-out invasion. A local government official later recalled, "During each overflight we had to assume we would be killed, that the bombing would begin, that we would never see our families again." After President Kennedy's October 22 address to the nation, Castro was convinced that a US attack was imminent -- that it would lead to a nuclear exchange in which Cuba would be annihilated. On the night of October 26, he wrote a message to Khrushchev that the Soviet leader understood to be a request to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States. Castro later stated that he was only trying to boost Khrushchev's morale -- to assure him of the resolve of the Cuban people. When Castro heard over the radio that Khrushchev had negotiated a resolution of the crisis with the United States on October 27, without consulting or informing the Cuban government, he was furious. Castro viewed it as nothing less than the Soviet Union's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution.
69. BRINK_121010_518.JPG: Stepping Back from the Brink: "Remove them. As quickly as possible. Before something terrible happens." -- Nikita S. Khrushchev, October 28, 1962 The final and most critical stages of these negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev took place on the open airwaves, simply because it was the fastest means of communication. With the world on the edge of nuclear war, speed trumped secrecy. On Sunday, October 28, Khrushchev and his advisers assembled at a dacha outside Moscow. With events escalating, the Soviet Premier was anxious to end the crisis as soon as possible; he started to dictate a letter to President Kennedy informing him that the missile sites in Cuba would be removed. When Khrushchev learned that the United States had made a secret offer to remove its missiles from Turkey, he readily agreed to keep that part of the agreement secret. To end the crisis as soon as possible, couriers rushed Khrushchev's message to the Moscow radio station where it was broadcast at approximately 4pm, 9am in Washington. President Kennedy learned of Khrushchev's decision to remove the missiles from Cuba when it was broadcast on the American airwaves. He replied later that day, welcoming the message as "an important contribution to peace," as he looked toward the future, stressing the importance of the two nations working together toward disarmament. Dismantling of the sites in Cuba began at 5pm that afternoon. Although the most acute phase of the confrontation ended that Sunday, the United States Strategic Air Command remained at DEFCON-2, and the quarantine remained in effect through November 20, when there was an agreement that all "offensive weapons" would be returned to the Soviet Union.
70. BRINK_121010_527.JPG: A Gift from the President: At the end of October, President Kennedy decided to present a memento to each of his advisers who assisted him through the ordeal. His secretary later recalled, "the one thing that was fixed in his mind was the idea of having the month of October ... with the dates 16-28 either circled or standing out in different print." He commissioned Tiffany & Company to create 34 silver-and-wood calendar paperweights. In addition to those who participated in the Ex Comm meetings during the most intense phase of the crisis, Jacqueline Kennedy and the President's personal secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, were among the recipients.
71. BRINK_121010_544.JPG: The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed at Moscow, August 5, 1963: This treaty prohibits nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Efforts to achieve a test ban agreement began in 1955 and extended over eight years. Having coming so close to nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev actively sought to reduce tensions between the two nations in the months that followed. This treaty was signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home. On September 24, the US Senate voted for its ratification, which the President signed on October 7. The treaty entered into force on October 10, 1963. According to the Special Counsel of the President, "no other single accomplishment in the White House ever gave him greater satisfaction."
72. BRINK_121010_549.JPG: "This was an effort to materially change the balance of power, it was done in secret, steps were taken really to deceive us by every means they could, and they were planning in November to open to the world the fact that they had these missiles so close to the United States. "The real problem is the Soviet desire to expand their power and influence.. It is this constant determination... [that] they will not settle for that kind of a peaceful world, but must settle for a Communist world. That is what makes the real danger, the combination of these two systems in conflict around the world in a nuclear age is what makes the sixties so dangerous." -- December 17, 1962 Less than one year after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. "Actually what we were trying to achieve was to have America shake itself out of its sleep and for its leadership to get a feeling of what war actually is... It is a consolation to me now that on the whole we acted correctly and accomplished a great revolutionary deed. We didn't get frightened and we didn't allow American imperialism to intimidate us. So many years have passed now, and it's plain for all to see... that the revolutionary cause headed by Fidel Castro is still alive and flourishing. The United States made a commitment not to invade Cuba itself and not allow its allies to invade, and thus far it has fulfilled that commitment." -- ca 1969 In October 1964 Khrushshev was removed form power. His misjudgments and mishandling of the crisis over the Cuban missile sites were cited among the causes for his ouster. "We started from the assumption that if there was an invasion of Cuba [by the United States], nuclear war would erupt ... Everybody here was simply resigned to the fate that we would be forced to pay the price, that we would disappear. "Not only were we left out from participating in seeking solutions to the crisis, but we were also left out of the historical research and the in-depth analysis of these events later on. "[W]e did have one victory, which was weapons free of charge... for almost thirty years, we received our weapons and arms free from the Soviet Union. This was one of the positive aspects of the October crisis. So, we didn't want to make relations bitter. Who could profit from that? No one was going to profit from that. We simply had to control that anger." -- 1992 Fidel Castro remained in power for 46 years after the missile crisis. He retired from official public life in 2008.
73. BRINK_121010_553.JPG: Portion of Khrushchev's message to the President, broadcast by Radio Moscow, October 28, 1962
74. BRINK_121010_558.JPG: Official copy of Premier Khrushchev's Message to President Kennedy, signed by Khrushchev, October 28, 1962, selected pages
75. BRINK_121010_564.JPG: Telegram of President Kennedy's message to Premier Khrushchev, October 28, 1962, received by the State Department and released to the press at 5:03pm
76. BRINK_121010_577.JPG: A Confrontation at the United Nations: "Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. And if you are ready to try, we are." -- US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin Even as the United States made military preparations for war, the President and the Ex Comm continued to pursue diplomatic solutions to the crisis. Seeking a show of solidarity with the countries in South and Central America, the United States presented its case to the Organization of American States (OAS), which voted unanimously on October 23 to condemn the Soviet Union and support the United States quarantine. Back channels -- unofficial lines of communication between the United States and the Soviet Union -- remained open and active, with intermediaries conveying messages between the two sides outside the more cumbersome and time-consuming State Department channels. And on October 25, at an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin with photographic evidence of the missile site construction in Cuba. It was a dramatic encounter that took place on the world stage, broadcast on television and witnessed by millions. These diplomatic initiatives helped to establish a legal justification for the quarantine and to bolster worldwide support for the US position.
77. BRINK_121010_621.JPG: President Kennedy's reading copy of his address to the nation, October 22, selected pages. On October 22, 1962, at 7:00pm, President Kennedy interrupted the nation's Monday night television programs with this public address. In a speech that lasted 17 minutes, he explained that the Soviet Union was in the process of installing nuclear weapons in Cuba. He said that the presence of these missiles so close to the United States would pose a mortal threat to the nation and upset the balance of power between the two superpowers, and that they must be removed. He outlined the steps he was taking in response. He did not shrink from disclosing the gravity of the threat, but he withheld details of the nuclear strike's full horror. Excerpts from the President's televised address are shown on the monitor at left.
78. BRINK_121010_635.JPG: "Khrushchev -- A Personality Sketch," prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1961, selected pages.
79. BRINK_121010_647.JPG: "Psychiatric Personality Study of Fidel Castro," December, 1961, prepared by the Psychiatric Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, selected pages.
80. BRINK_121010_662.JPG: Tuesday, October 16: The President and his advisers were briefed on the photographic evidence of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba: images showing the presence of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). MRBMs had a target range of approximately 1,000 miles, with Washington, DC, Dallas, Texas, and Cape Canaveral, Florida, all falling within that range.
81. BRINK_121010_666.JPG: Thursday, October 18: Most Ex Comm meetings began with an intelligence update delivered by John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. On October 18, he reported that photo analysts found evidence of site construction for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). With a target range of nearly 2,200 miles, nearly twice as large an area as the range of the MRBMs. IRBMs in Cuba would pose a threat to all parts of the United States, except for the northwest Pacific coast. Over the next two days, the President maintained his normal schedule to avoid arousing public interest. He would not publicly reveal that there was crisis until he had decided on a response. His advisers met almost continuously in smaller groups and debated various courses of action. The debates were heated. At first, the only point on which all could agree is that some action must be taken: the Soviet missile deployment could not be tolerated.
82. BRINK_121010_669.JPG: Friday, October 19: Analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center came to the following conclusions after studying the reconnaissance photos: -- 2 MRBM sites (medium-range ballistic missiles had a target range of approximately 1,000 miles) were already operational and that eight more would be operational within a week. -- 2 sites intended for IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a target range of approximately 2,200 miles) would be operational within 6 to 8 weeks. On Friday morning, the President assembled his military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A blockade alone would be a weak response, they argued; Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay characterized that strategy as "appeasement" -- an emotionally charged term that referred to British and French acquiescence to Nazi territorial demands in Europe in the 1930s. The terms had also become synonymous with cowardice. The Joint Chiefs urged swift military action. Throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy and others were convinced that the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba was linked to the presence of the United States in West Berlin. President Kennedy believed that if the United States were to take military action against the missile sites in Cuba, the Soviets would respond with military action in West Berlin, a city he had vowed to protect. "The Cuba-Berlin connection is what makes our problem so difficult," the President said, at one point. If the Soviets were to take Berlin by force, he said, he would have no alternative but to fire nuclear weapons in response. The fate of Berlin dominated many of the Ex Comm's discussions.
83. BRINK_121010_673.JPG: Monday, October 22: Director of Central Intelligence John McCone briefed the congressional leaders summoned to the White House: -- Four medium-range ballistic missile sites, with a range of approximately 1,000 miles, were in full operational readiness. -- 24 medium-range ballistic missile launchers and 12 intermediate-range ballistic launch pads were under construction. -- 18 Soviet ships were in Cuban ports; 25 more were on their way. -- The Soviets had installed 24 surface-to-air missile bases, several cruise missile defense sites, 40 MiG fighter planes and 20 IL-28 bombers. Summary: almost the entire United States was vulnerable to the IRBMs; and the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were likely to shoot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane "within a short time." On Saturday afternoon, October 20, the President made his decision. He chose a blockade over military strikes or invasion, with the idea that a blockade was a limited action and that further military steps could be taken later, if necessary. He would address the nation the following Monday evening at 7pm, speaking publicly about the national crisis for the first time. Before the announcement, he would meet with congressional leaders to alert them to the situation in Cuba and his response. Scattered across the country, some 20 key members of Congress were summoned back to Washington for an emergency meeting with the President. Two hours before the President's broadcast, they entered the Cabinet room at the White House. Alerted to the crisis for the first time, Senator Richard Russell, Majority Leader from Georgia, voiced his concerns about the blockade strategy and urged stronger military action.
84. BRINK_121010_678.JPG: Wednesday, October 24: John McCone reported the following intelligence: -- 22 Soviet ships were headed to Cuba; 3 of them had hatches large enough to hold missiles -- Three of four Soviet submarines were in the Atlantic Ocean, nearby -- Construction on the missile sites in Cuba was not only progressing, but accelerating; construction on buildings to store nuclear material was proceeding rapidly. At 10am Wednesday morning, as the quarantine went into effect, the Ex Comm assembled in the Cabinet Room to discuss how, exactly, it would be implemented. Secretary of Defense McNamara reported that two Soviet ships were approaching the quarantine line; one of them -- the Kimovsk -- had hatches large enough to hold missiles and would be targeted for interception by the USS Essex near the quarantine line before noon. Even more ominously, he reported the presence of Soviet submarines that had the ability to sink a US warship. The submarines should be dealt with, he argued, before the Navy attempted to intercept the Soviet ship. McNamara proposed a series of antisubmarine tactics to force the submarines to surface and, as much as the President wanted to avoid hostilities against a Soviet submarine, he approved the use of small explosive "depth charges." Robert Kennedy later described this conversion as one of the tensest moments of the crisis. In the middle of this discussion, the Ex Comm received word that six of the Soviet ships identified as being "in Cuban waters," had either stopped or reversed course, and the President ordered the USS Essex to put a hold on her plans to intercept the Soviet ship. The plan to harass the Soviet submarines with "warning depth charges," however, did proceed.
85. BRINK_121010_682.JPG: Saturday, October 27: The Ex Comm met almost continuously throughout this day. The President and his advisers tried to untangle their confusion over two conflicting messages from Khrushchev. They tried to interpret the meaning of Major Anderson's U-2 plane being shot down over Cuba: was it a deliberate escalation by the Soviets, or not? And the ExComm discussed how to allay the Soviets' fears about the plane that had strayed over Soviet territory at a time when American military forces were on a high alert. They raced against the clock, wrestling with all these questions as the missiles in Cuba moved closer and closer to full operational readiness. The one point on which there was both clarity and agreement was the need for an immediate cessation of work on the missile sites.
Multi Column: Number of columns of thumbnails to appear per page (normally defaults to 3): [1 col] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Bigger photos? To save server space, the full-sized versions of these images have either not been loaded to the server or have been removed from the server. (Only some pages are loaded with full-sized images and those usually get removed after three months.) I still have them though. If you want me to email them to you, please send an email to guthrie.bruce@gmail.com and I can email them to you, or, depending on the number of images, just repost the page again will the full-sized images.
Directly Related Pages: Other pages with content (DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: ) directly related to this one: [Display ALL photos on one page]:
- 2022_DC_Archives_Sports: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: All American: The Power of Sports (185 photos from 2022)
- 2020_DC_Archives_Hers: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Rightfully Hers: American Women and the Vote (5 photos from 2020)
- 2019_DC_Archives_Hers: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Rightfully Hers: American Women and the Vote (189 photos from 2019)
- 2019_DC_Archives_Eman: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Emancipation Proclamation and DC Emancipation Act (2019) (32 photos from 2019)
- 2018_DC_Archives_VietCopters: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Remembering Vietnam -- Helicopters on front lawn @ Veterans Day Week (32 photos from 2018)
- 2017_DC_Archives_Vietnam: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Remembering Vietnam (187 photos from 2017)
- 2017_DC_Archives_VietCopters: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Remembering Vietnam -- Helicopters on front lawn @ Opening (26 photos from 2017)
- 2016_DC_Archives_Amending: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Amending America (224 photos from 2016)
- 2015_DC_Archives_Spirited: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Spirited Republic (185 photos from 2015)
- 2014_DC_Archives_Signatures: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Making Their Mark: Stories Through Signatures (215 photos from 2014)
- ...More (List all 32 pages)...
Same Subject: Click on this link to see coverage of items having the same subject: [National Archives (Everything)] [National Archives (Non-Events)] [Display ALL National Archives (Non-Events) photos]
2012 photos: Equipment this year: My mainstays were the Fuji S100fs, Nikon D7000, and the new Fuji X-S1. I also used an underwater Fuji XP50 and a Nikon D600. The first three cameras all broke this year and had to be repaired. Trips this year: three Civil War Trust conferences (Shepherdstown, WV, Richmond, VA, and Williamsburg, VA), a week-long family reunion cruise of the Caribbean, another week-long family reunion in the Wisconsin Dells (with lots of in-transit time in Ohio and Indiana), and my 7th consecutive San Diego Comic-Con trip (including side trips to Zion, Bryce, the Grand Canyon, etc). Ego strokes: I had a picture of Miss DC, Ashley Boalch, published in the Washington Post. I had a photograph of the George Segal San Francisco Holocaust memorial used as the cover of Quebec Francais (issue 165). Not being able to read French, I'm not entirely sure what the article is about but, hey! And I guess what could be considered to be a positive thing, my site is now established enough that spammers have noticed it and I had to block 17,000 file description postings for Viagra and whatever else.. Number of photos taken this year: just below 410,000.
Connection Not Secure messages? Those warnings you get from your browser about this site not having secure connections worry some people. This means this site does not have SSL installed (the link is http:, not https:). That's bad if you're entering credit card numbers, passwords, or other personal information. But this site doesn't collect any personal information so SSL is not necessary. Life's good!
Limiting Text: You can turn off all of this text by clicking this link: [Thumbnails Only]
Photo Contact: [Email Bruce Guthrie].