SDMMSU_070724_136
Existing comment: The Battle of Trafalgar:
It is now 12:45, 21 October 1805, twelve miles off the coast of Cape Trafalgar... and you are there.
At about 12:45pm on 21 October 1805, HMS Victory (100), flagship of Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson, broke through the line of the combined French and Spanish fleet. By choice or by chance, Nelson cut the line right behind Bucentaure (80), the flagship of the combined fleet commander, Vice Admiral Pierre Villeneuve. Forty-five minutes earlier, HMS Royal Sovereign (100) fired the first British shots of the battle and subsequently cut the line, engaging the Spanish ship Santa Ana (112).
This was the culmination of six months of cat and mouse maneuvering stretching from Toulon, France in the Mediterranean to the West Indies and back to Cadiz, Spain. Admiral Villeneuve had been ordered by Emperor Napoleon to bring his combined fleet to Brest, France, where he would break the British imposed blockage and combine forces with the French fleet there. They would then sail up the English Channel, take the British Channel Fleet by surprise, and establish maritime control of the channel. The French invasion of the British Isles could then begin. Nelson's job was to prevent this. He could accomplish this by keeping the fleet blockaded in Cadiz, or he could lure them out and defeat them. He chose the second course of action.
The combined French/Spanish fleet was all underway from Cadiz by dawn on 20 October. British frigates had already reported the fleet's departure, so it was no surprise. Nelson moved his fleet to intercept and engage. By 4:00pm, the wind shifted from the South-South-Westerly direction to the West (wind coming from the west). Villeneuve headed south towards the Straits of Gibraltar and into the Mediterranean. Once it was obvious his departure was not a secret, apparently Villeneuve decided fighting Nelson and trying to weather Cape St. Vincent to the north before engaging the blockading fleet off Brest was more than he wanted to tackle. He was headed to the Mediterranean and the French base at Toulon.
The British sighted the Combined Fleet at just before 6:00am on the 21st with the dawn. It would be a half hour or so before the Combined Fleet saw the British. By 6:20am, both fleets had been ordered to "form a line of battle." They were no more than ten miles apart. The approach was slow due to the light winds. The British fleet was formed up in two lines, approaching the Combined Fleet at almost a right angle. Nelson's squadron was formed up almost directly astern while the squadron under Vice American Cuthburt Collingwood (Royal Sovereign 100) was in more of an echelon. Whether this was due to a misread flag signal or the anticipation to get at the enemy, or both, is not certain.
The Combined Fleet was in much more disarray. The departure from Cadiz the day before was not very orderly. They were not able to get in desired formation when they turned south just before sunset. It got no better during the night when most captains were more interested in avoiding collisions than keeping formation. The light winds and moderate swell from the west did not help matters. By about 8:00am, it was clear to Villeneuve that if he continued his present course, the van (front) of his fleet could clear Cape Trafalgar and make a clear run into the Med, but his center and rear would be caught by the British fleet. He decided to turn and head back to the north so his whole fleet could be engaged. This slow turn in a beaming sea only added to the turmoil.
Nelson used unconventional and, at the time, controversial tactics. By coming straight on to the Combined Fleet, the leading flagships were subject to enemy fire of four or five ships for a half mile (in this case, a half hour). Ideally, the Combined Fleet could pummel the lead sips until dismasted then shift to the next in line, reducing the British fleet to rubble. Nelson understood, however, that the French and Spanish gunners were not well trained, they normally fired hire, and they did not have a good rate of fire. There was also a moderate swell from the west, causing the ships to roll in the light breeze and throwing what gunnery skills they did have into a cocked hat. If he could cut off a portion of the enemy fleet and bring his ships alongside the enemy, he was sure he would prevail.
By 4:15pm, the battle was over. The British had captured nineteen ships; one French ship, Achilles (74), was afire and would explode in a few hours. It was a resounding British victory. However, Nelson was mortally wounded below deck and would live for only fifteen more minutes.
The battle won, maintaining the beaten fleet proved difficult for the British. By dusk, the winds started to pick up and by midnight the battered ships had to contend with a heavy gale, which lasted off and on for three days. Dismasted ships could not be controlled. Ships under tow sometimes had their towlines part or were cast off because the towing ship was in jeopardy. During this whole period, they had [to] fight to keep from going aground in the shoal waters around Cape Trafalgar. While no British ships were lost, many French and Spanish were. Of the nineteen ships captured, only four managed to get to Gibraltar. Of the others, some sank, some were recaptured and run aground, and several others escaped after being recaptured.
Despite the tarnish, the victory had significant impact. Napoleon's navy was in shambles and never again ventured out to challenge the British. The threat of invasion was gone and Napoleon had to continue only as a land force. The Napoleonic wars would last another ten years. Britain's supremacy of the sea, however, would remain unchallenged for the next century and more. The next major naval battle would not occur until Jutland in 1916, and Britannia's rule of the waves would continue until the 1940s.
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