Existing comment:
Tank-Infantry Coordination:
During World War II, tank and infantry units encountered problems coordinating their efforts at the company and platoon levels. These difficulties were noted and corrective measures taken, including the incorporation of tanks within infantry divisions. However, in the opening phases of the Korean War, many of the same tactical coordination problems re-emerged. Consequently, the same lessons from World War II had to be relearned.
Too often, tanks tended to lose contact with accompanying riflemen, or infantry withdrew, leaving tanks in unsupported exposed positions. The enemy exploited this lack of coordination. In November 1950, for example, the Chinese overran two battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment and their supporting tanks. While the infantry deployed in high ground, the tanks remained road-bound. Thus separated, the Chinese defeated the armor and infantry separately. Tanks without infantry were particularly vulnerable at night to infiltrating Chinese soldiers, who attacked at close range with satchel charges, anti-tank rockets, and recoilless rifles. |