Existing comment:
Dean on the Smoking Gun Defense
The Nixon Defense (2014)
When revealed by order of the US Supreme Court in late July 1974, this became known as the "smoking gun" conversation, because it was viewed as hard evidence, demonstrating beyond question, that Nixon's final defense about the Watergate break-in was bogus, which doomed the Nixon presidency. Ironically, this conversation has been mistakenly understood as an effort my [by] Nixon and Haldeman to shut down the FBI's entire Watergate investigation. This appears to be the case only when viewed out of context. In August 1974, when the conversation was revealed, and Nixon and his lawyers had to focus on this conversation, he had long forgotten what was actually involved; they assumed it had the same meaning as everyone else. In reality, it was only an effort by Haldeman to stop the FBI from investigating an anonymous campaign contribution from Mexico that Justice Department prosecutors had already agreed was outside the scoop [scope] of the Watergate investigation. In fact, this conversation did not put the lie to Nixon's statements, and had Nixon known that he might have survived its disclosure to fight another day. In short, the smoking gun was shooting blanks.
[Footnote at pp. 55-56]
Note, the actual quote, in John Dean's "The Nixon Defense Deluxe: What He Knew and When He Knew It" is similar but not identical to what was shown in the slide.
When revealed by order of the US Supreme Court in late July 1974, this became known as the "smoking gun" conversation, because it was viewed as hard evidence, demonstrating beyond question, that Nixon's final defense about the Watergate break-in in his April 30, 1973, speech, followed by his May 22, 1973, statement was bogus, which doomed the Nixon presidency. Ironically, this conversation has been mistakenly understood as an effort my by Nixon and Haldeman to shut down the FBI's entire Watergate investigation. This appears to be the case only when viewed out of context. In August 1974, when the conversation was revealed, and Nixon and his lawyers had to focus on this conversation, he had long forgotten what was actually involved; they assumed it had the same meaning as everyone else . In reality, it was only an effort by Haldeman to stop the FBI from investigating an anonymous campaign contribution from Mexico that the Justice Department prosecutors had already agreed was outside the scope of the Watergate investigation. In approving this action, however, Nixon slightly expanded the request, saying that the FBI should also stay out of Howard Hunt's CIA-related activities. In fact, this conversation did not put the lie to Nixon's April 30 and May 22, 1973, statements, and had Nixon known that he might have survived its disclosure to fight another day. This is not to say, however, that Nixon's April 30 and May 22, 1973, statements were not a lie, as countless other conversations later revealed. In short, the smoking gun was only firing blanks. |