BGuthrie Photos: DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Remembering Vietnam

DC -- Natl Archives -- Exhibit: Remembering Vietnam:

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Description of Pictures: Remembering Vietnam Exhibition
Twelve Critical Episodes in the Vietnam War
November 10, 2017–January 6, 2019
This exhibition presents both iconic and recently discovered National Archives records related to 12 critical episodes in the Vietnam War. They trace the policies and decisions made by the architects of the conflict and help untangle why the United States became involved in Vietnam, why it went on so long, and why it was so divisive for American society.
It is important to answer these questions. The sacrifices made by veterans and their families, the magnitude of death and destruction, and the war’s lasting effects require no less. Yet many only know the war through a handful of slogans, lyrics, and film scenes. “Remembering Vietnam” is a resource for refreshing our collective memory. Its collection of evidence provides an opportunity for new insight and greater understanding of one of the most consequential wars in American history.

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Copyrights: All pictures were taken by amateur photographer Bruce Guthrie (me!) who retains copyright on them. Free for non-commercial use with attribution. See the [Creative Commons] definition of what this means. "Photos (c) Bruce Guthrie" is fine for attribution. (Commercial use folks including AI scrapers can of course contact me.) Feel free to use in publications and pages with attribution but you don't have permission to sell the photos themselves. A free copy of any printed publication using any photographs is requested. Descriptive text, if any, is from a mixture of sources, quite frequently from signs at the location or from official web sites; copyrights, if any, are retained by their original owners.

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Specific picture descriptions: Photos above with "i" icons next to the bracketed sequence numbers (e.g. "[1] ") are described as follows:
1. VIET_171108_008.JPG: Remembering Vietnam "All wars are fought twice, the first time on the battlefield, the second time in memory." -- Viet Thanh Nguyen
2. VIET_171108_024.JPG: Why did the U.S. get involved? Why was the war so long? Why was it so controversial? 58,315 Americans killed in action 4 million Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians killed $169 billion spent ($908 billion today) 1.6 million Vietnamese refugees resettled
3. VIET_171108_027.JPG: Remembering Vietnam Twelve critical episodes in the Vietnam War This exhibition presents both iconic and recently discovered National Archives records related to 12 critical episodes in the Vietnam War. They trace the policies and decisions made by the architects of the conflict and help untangle why the United States became involved in Vietnam, why it went on so long, and why it was so divisive for American society. It is important to answer these questions. The sacrifices made by veterans and their families, the magnitude of death and destruction, and the war's lasting effects require no less. Yet many only know the war through a handful of slogans, lyrics, and film scenes. "Remembering Vietnam" is a resource for refreshing our collective memory. Its collection of evidence provides an opportunity for new insight and greater understanding of one of the most consequential wars in American history.
4. VIET_171108_031.JPG: Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Secretary of State Cordell Hull 1/24/1944 President Franklin D. Roosevelt opposed continued French rule of Vietnam following World War II. In this memo he wrote: "France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indochina are entitled to something better than that." But FDR died before the Potsdam Conference, where President Harry S Truman and the other Allied leaders planned the disarming of the occupying Japanese troops. They decided China would oversee the evacuation of the Japanese in the North and Britain in the South. Against orders, the British commander in charge helped the French to reestablish control of Vietnam.
5. VIET_171108_037.JPG: Letter from Ho Chi Minh to President Harry Truman 1/18/1946 In 1945, during World War II, Japanese troops took control of Vietnam (under French rule at the time). At the end of the war, Ho Chi Minh -- the Vietnamese Communist leader -- seized an opportunity to escape decades of French rule. The day Japan surrendered to the Allies, Ho Chi Minh declared independence in front of a crowd of exhilarated Vietnamese. In a deliberate appeal for American support, he opened his speech with the words: "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among them are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Ho Chi Minh sent this letter to President Harry S. Truman on the occasion of the assembly of the United Nations, asking for American help in securing Vietnamese independence from France. The United States did not support the Vietnamese struggle, however. The U.S. government adopted a neutral policy when France went to war to recolonize Vietnam in 1945; and President Harry S. Truman later authorized financial and military assistance to the French in 1950.
6. VIET_171108_044.JPG: Truman Sides with France Truman aids France it its war to recolonize Vietnam -- the beginning of a 25-year involvement
7. VIET_171108_048.JPG: Between the Hammer and the Sickle 9/12/1951 With France's war in Vietnam in its fifth year, the United States Government became convinced that Chinese armed units were about to invade Vietnam to support their North Vietnamese allies. In response, it stepped up military, economic, and political programs. This poster was part of the U.S. Information Agency's anti-Communist propaganda campaign "using all media borrowed or bought -- radio, pamphlets, press, agents, (and) word-of-mouth." Depicted is an attack on the Associated State of Vietnam (South Vietnam) by communist forces from the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Each hand is depicted with a flag from these nations as they use a hammer and sickle to assault the State.
8. VIET_171108_059.JPG: A French Foreign Legionnaire Goes to War ca. 1954 The French fought to recolonize Vietnam from 1946 to 1954. The U.S. government needed France's cooperation to contain the spread of communism in Europe. From 1946 to 1950, it adopted a neutral policy toward the conflict. In 1950 President Harry S. Truman authorized direct financial and military assistance to the French. This photograph shows a French Foreign Legionnaire taking part in a sweep of a communist area near Hanoi. The tank in the background was supplied by the United States. The original caption reads, "a French Foreign Legionnaire goes to war along the dry rib of a rice paddy, during a recent sweep through communist-held areas in the Red River Delta, between Haiphong and Hanoi. Behind the Legionnaire is a U.S. gifted tank."
9. VIET_171108_066.JPG: Metz Medal of Liberation 8/24/1945 During his official visit to Washington in 1945, French President Charles de Gaulle presented President Harry S. Truman with this medal to thank the United States for its help liberating France from German occupation. During the visit, Truman told de Gaulle that the U.S. would not oppose a return of French authority in Indochina.
10. VIET_171108_071.JPG: Memorandum of Conversation Between Ambassador William G. Bullitt and Charlton Coburg 5/29/1947 William Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France had conflicted feelings about French recolonization of Vietnam after World War II. He said, "to keep this poor people down with arms would be disgusting." But he also said the Vietnamese "are essentially childish," concluding the Soviets were behind their bid for freedom. In fact, Moscow didn't recognize the Hanoi government until 1949.
11. VIET_171108_095.JPG: Looking Back Ho Chi Minh's quest for American support
12. VIET_171108_111.JPG: The Domino Theory
13. VIET_171108_112.JPG: Operational Priority Communication from Archimedes Patti 9/2/1945 In 1945, during World War II, Japanese troops took control of Vietnam (under French rule at the time). At the end of the war, Ho Chi Minh -- the Vietnamese Communist leader -- seized an opportunity to escape decades of French rule. The day Japan surrendered to the Allies, Ho Chi Minh declared independence in front of a crowd of exhilarated Vietnamese. In a deliberate appeal for American support, he opened his speech with the words: "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among them are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Before he declared independence in front of thousands of cheering citizens in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh asked U.S. Office of Strategic Services officer Archimedes Patti to check his wording of the first passage. He needed an American for the job because he'd borrowed it from the Declaration of Independence. Patti recorded his impressions of the Viet Minh (a national independence coalition dominated by communists) in this report. He wrote: "From what I have seen these people mean business and I'm afraid that the French will have to deal with them. For that matter we will all have to deal with them." China and Britain oversaw the repatriation of Japanese soldiers from Vietnam after the end of the war. The U.S. government adopted a neutral policy when France went to war to recolonize Vietnam in 1945; and President Harry S. Truman later authorized financial and military assistance to the French in 1950.
14. VIET_171108_129.JPG: OSS Officers Watch as Viet Minh Practice Throwing Grenades 8/17/1945 The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a predecessor of the modern CIA, was a U.S. intelligence-gathering agency during World War II. The OSS enlisted Ho Chi Minh to broadcast radio reports on weather and Japanese troop movements to U.S. intelligence operatives stationed in China. Later, his Viet Minh (a national independence coalition dominated by communists) guerrillas joined forces with an OSS team. The OSS team supplied a group of 200 Viet Minh guerrillas with American weapons and training. These fighters, many of them barefoot, impressed the Americans by how quickly they learned to fire the American M-1 rifle and M-1 carbine and to use mortars, grenades, bazookas and machine guns.
15. VIET_171108_133.JPG: This is an American Soldier - He is Your Friend 7/5/1945 In 1945, during World War II, Japanese troops took control of Vietnam (under French rule at the time). The U.S. Psychological Warfare Office and the Office of War Information in China developed this leaflet when it appeared that American forces might enter Vietnam to liberate it from Japanese occupation. In the end, China and Britain oversaw the repatriation of Japanese soldiers, and the pamphlet wasn't needed. At the end of the war, Ho Chi Minh -- the Vietnamese Communist leader -- seized an opportunity to escape decades of French rule. The day Japan surrendered to the Allies, Ho Chi Minh declared independence in front of a crowd of exhilarated Vietnamese. In a deliberate appeal for American support, he opened his speech with the words: "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among them are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." But the U.S. government adopted a neutral policy when France went to war to recolonize Vietnam in 1945; and President Harry S. Truman authorized direct financial and military assistance to the French in 1950.
16. VIET_171108_138.JPG: Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) speaking at the foundational congress of the French Communist Party, Tours December 1920
17. VIET_171108_145.JPG: Letter from Ho Chi Minh to Secretary of State Robert Lansing 6/18/1919 1 2 3 4 Ho Chi Minh appealed to the United States to help the Vietnamese win independence from the French several times. His first attempt to win American support was at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I, in which the Allied forces met to set the peace terms for the defeated nations. Nguyen Ai Quoc (one of Ho Chi Minh's early aliases) sent this letter as a representative of "le Groupe des Patriotes Annamites" ("the Group of Annamite Patriots") to Secretary of State Robert Lansing. He had reason to be hopeful. President Wilson's Fourteen Points Declaration (a statement of principles for peace to end World War I) called for self-determination for all peoples. But Wilson's priority was European self-government. Although Ho Chi Minh received a note saying that the petition would be shared with President Wilson, there was no further response. The letter contains the enclosure "Revendications du Peuple Annamite" ("Claims of the Annamite People"). It's a call for reform of the French colonial system, directed at French colonial officials. Ho Chi Minh used the term "Annamite" because "Vietnamien" (Vietnamese) with its nationalist overtones, was forbidden by the French. Annam is the name the French gave the central region of French Indochina. The petition was published in L'Humanit�, a French socialist newspaper. Copies were distributed on the streets of Paris and found their way to Hanoi. The letter and enclosure are written in French. There is an English translation to the letter, made by the National Archives in 1969. translation of the letter:] To his Excellency, the Secretary of State of the Republic of the United States, Delegate to the Peace Conference. Excellency, We take the liberty of submitting to you the accompanying memorandum setting forth the claims of the Vietnamese people on the occasion of the Allied victory. We count on your great kindness to honor our appeal by your support whenever the opportunity arises. We beg your Excellency graciously to accept the expression of our profound respect. For the group of Vietnamese Patriots [signed] Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot) 56, Rue Monsieur le Prince, 56 -Paris-
18. VIET_171108_155.JPG: Council of Four at the WWI Paris Peace Conference, May 27, 1919 The cutaway tailcoat or "morning coat" was favored by the leaders of the Allied powers, as you can see in this photograph. To project an air of legitimacy, Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) put on a rented morning coat when he sought an audience with President Wilson at Versailles.
19. VIET_171108_164.JPG: [translation of "Demands of the Annamese People":] Since the victory of the Allies, all subject peoples are filled with hope at the prospect that an era of right and justice is opening to them by virtue of the formal and solemn engagements, made before the whole world by the various powers of the agreement in the struggle of civilization against barbarism. While waiting for the principle of national self-determination to pass from ideal to reality through the effective recognition of the sacred right of all peoples to decide their own destiny, the inhabitants of the ancient Empire of Annam, at the present time French Indochina, present to the noble Governments of the entente in general and in particular to the honorable French Government the following humble claims: (1) General amnesty for all the native people who have been condemned for political activity; (2) Reform of Indochinese justice by granting to the native population the same judicial guarantees as the Europeans have, and the total suppression of the special courts which are the instruments of terrorization and oppression against the most responsible elements of the Vietnamese people; (3) Freedom of press and speech; (4) Freedom of association and assembly; (5) Freedom to emigrate and to travel abroad; (6) Freedom of education, and creation in every province of technical and professional schools for the native population; (7) Replacement of the regime of arbitrary decrees by a regime of law; (8) A permanent delegation of native people elected to attend the French parliament in order to keep the latter informed of their needs; The Vietnamese people, in presenting these claims, count on the worldwide justice of all the Powers, and rely in particular on the goodwill of the noble French people who hold our destiny in their hands and who, as France is a republic, have taken us under their protection. In requesting the protection of the French people, the people of Annam, far from feeling humiliated, on the contrary consider themselves honored, because they know that the French people stand for liberty and justice and will never renounce their sublime ideal of universal brotherhood. Consequently, in giving heed to the voice of the oppressed, the French people will be doing their duty to France and to humanity. For the group of Vietnamese Patriots Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh)
20. VIET_171108_171.JPG: Communism Means Terrorism 9/15/1954 This poster, created and distributed internationally by the United States Information Agency (USIA), says "Anywhere there is communism, there is terrorism and assassination!" It was designed to amplify fear of communism in a newly divided Vietnam. Earlier in 1954, the Geneva Accords had called for a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel -- creating a communist state in the North and a French-backed non-communist state in the South. A series of events intensified the "Red Scare" that gripped Americans in the 1940s and 50s. In 1949 the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic bomb. Chinese Communists formed the People's Republic of China that same year. North Korea invaded South Korea the next. Many interpreted these events as evidence of a global Communist plot. USIA posters were designed to promote U.S. values; to expose alleged Communist falsehoods, threats, and crimes; and to strengthen understanding of and support for U.S. objectives in the Cold War.
21. VIET_171108_175.JPG: Eisenhower Back Diem Eisenhower commits U.S. support for the new anti-Communist South Vietnamese government
22. VIET_171108_182.JPG: Vietnamese Army's Seven Commandments Poster 3 5/28/1956 This propaganda poster comes from a series of army behavior posters used during the Vietnam War. It says "Do not engage in vices, drinking, gambling, inappropriate conduct with women, and drugs." American advisers counseled the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to be more considerate of the people they were charged with protecting -- for instance, to stop running over farmers' chickens with their trucks. The ARVN had to overcome cultural differences with the rural population, as well as suspicion over its former association with the French colonizers.
23. VIET_171108_184.JPG: Vietnamese Army's Seven Commandments Poster 7 5/28/1956 This propaganda poster comes from a series of army behavior posters used during the Vietnam War. It says "You must be close to the people, protect the people and help the people." American advisers counseled the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to stop running over farmers' chickens with their trucks and be more considerate of the people they were charged with protecting. The ARVN had to overcome cultural differences with the rural population, as well as suspicion over its former association with the French colonizers.
24. VIET_171108_189.JPG: Gift of State from Ngo Dinh Diem to President Eisenhower 11/14/1954 South Vietnamese President Diem presented this tusk lamp to President Eisenhower on November 14, 1954. Earlier in 1954, the Geneva Accords had called for a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel -- creating a Communist state in the North and a French-backed non-Communist state in the South. The agreement called for an election to reunify the two zones in 1956. Eisenhower believed "losing" South Vietnam to communism would be a strategic, economic, and humanitarian disaster. So he pledged support to an emerging leader -- Ngo Dinh Diem -- a devout Catholic and fervent anti-French, anti-Communist nationalist. Diem faced multiple threats: some members of his inherited government and military were associated with the hated French; mobsters controlled much of Saigon; and French-supported armed religious sects and military officers challenged his leadership. Against all odds, Diem consolidated power; though the "Diem Miracle" would prove to be short-lived.
25. VIET_171108_197.JPG: Press Release of Letter from President Dwight Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem 10/25/1954 The 1954 Geneva Accords had called for a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel -- creating a Communist state in the North and a French-backed non-Communist state in the South. The agreement called for an election to reunify the two zones in 1956. Eisenhower believed "losing" South Vietnam to communism would be a strategic, economic, and humanitarian disaster. So he pledged support to an emerging leader -- Ngo Dinh Diem -- a devout Catholic and fervent anti-French, anti-Communist nationalist. In this letter, President Eisenhower offered South Vietnamese President Diem financial support and encouraged him to make "needed reforms" to broaden his government and make it more representative. But President Diem's ideas about nation building differed from those held by the U.S. His early successes against his enemies only reinforced his authoritarian tendencies and his conviction that he knew better than the Americans how to govern South Vietnam.
26. VIET_171108_199.JPG: President Eisenhower Greets Ngo Dinh Diem 5/8/1957 South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem received a rare honor when he arrived in Washington, DC, for a state visit -- President Eisenhower personally greeted him at the airport. In this photograph, Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (from left) greet Diem at Washington National. The 1954 Geneva Accords had called for a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel -- creating a Communist state in the North and a French-backed non-Communist state in the South. The agreement called for an election to reunify the two zones in 1956. Eisenhower believed "losing" South Vietnam to communism would be a strategic, economic, and humanitarian disaster. So he pledged support to an emerging leader -- Ngo Dinh Diem -- a devout Catholic and fervent anti-French, anti-Communist nationalist. Diem faced multiple threats: some members of his inherited government and military were associated with the hated French; mobsters controlled much of Saigon; and French-supported armed religious sects and military officers challenged his leadership. Against all odds, Diem consolidated power; though the "Diem Miracle" would prove to be short-lived.
27. VIET_171108_204.JPG: President Ngo Dinh Diem 11/25/1954 This poster shows President Ngo Dinh Diem, first President of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) from 1955 until a military coup and his assassination in 1963. After the 1954 Geneva Accords called for a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel (Communist in the North and French-backed non-Communist in the South) and an election to reunify the two zones in 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower committed U.S. support to the new anti-Communist South Vietnamese government. Diem inscribed the poster: "We must combine our hearts and spirits, our determination, and our abilities in order to defend the homeland and the people's welfare in independence and unity." But Diem faced multiple threats: some members of his inherited government and military were associated with the hated French; mobsters controlled much of Saigon; and French-supported armed religious sects and military officers challenged his leadership.
28. VIET_171108_209.JPG: Episode 2: Eisenhower Backs Diem
29. VIET_171108_216.JPG: Come South 8/5/1954 The 1954 Geneva Accords called for a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel -- creating a Communist state in the North and a French-backed non-Communist state in the South. There was a 300-day period of free travel between North and South Vietnam before the border closed. The U.S. ran a propaganda campaign to encourage Northerners to "Go South to avoid Communism," where they would be "welcomed with open arms." The campaign wasn't needed. Hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese had religious, economic, and other reasons to flee communism.
30. VIET_171108_223.JPG: Episode 3: Kennedy Doubles Down Kennedy invests in a military solution to a political question: What type of government will rule a united Vietnam?
31. VIET_171108_224.JPG: Kennedy, McNamara, and Taylor in the Oval Office at the White House 10/2/1963 This photograph shows president John F. Kennedy (in rocking chair) meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor (far left). Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported to President Kennedy on their recent survey trip to South Vietnam, and gave their recommendations on pressuring South Vietnam's President Diem to respect civil rights and focus more on fighting Communists. Kennedy had sent McNamara and Taylor on the trip after United States Marine Corps General Victor Krulak and Foreign Service Officer Joseph Mendenhall returned from Vietnam with conflicting reports. Kennedy had asked them, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" The disagreement centered on whether the war was being won militarily, or if it it should instead be considered a political war – a war for men's minds.
32. VIET_171108_228.JPG: Strategic Hamlet Propaganda Poster In South Vietnam, the U.S.-supported Diem administration oversaw the building of fortified villages called "Strategic Hamlets" to control rural political activity. President Diem's influential brother and chief political advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, saw the Strategic Hamlets as both protection for rural residents and a way to enlist them to actively combat the communists on the side of the government – ideas urged by this propaganda leaflet. A translation reads: The whole population actively participates in guerrilla warfare, in the construction of strategic villages and hamlets, in maintaining increased vigilance, in the maintenance of security, [and] in making every effort to support and consolidate the expansion of the liberated zone. The rural population resented having to move from their ancestral lands to the hamlets they were forced to build. This alienated the population from the South Vietnamese government; and it didn't keep the Viet Cong away.
33. VIET_171108_233.JPG: Draft Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem 12/14/1962 Kennedy pledged a dramatic increase in American military support in response to a letter President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) sent requesting aid. The White House believed that North Vietnam's aggression -- demonstrated by its direction and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam -- was a violation of the Geneva Accords. Therefore, Kennedy was willing to respond in kind.
34. VIET_171108_239.JPG: President John F. Kennedy at Press Conference 3/23/1961 This photograph shows President Kennedy standing at a lectern in the State Department auditorium in Washington, DC. A map of Laos on the left reads "Communist Rebel Areas, 22 March 1961." When Kennedy took office, the communist-backed Pathet Lao insurgents were about to take over Laos. In 1962, the Geneva Conference agreed to a declaration on the neutrality of Laos under a coalition government. The Indochinese Communist Party used land it seized in Laos to build part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was a major conduit for Communist supplies and support, ensuring that Laos would remain a battlefront throughout the Vietnam War.
35. VIET_171108_243.JPG: President Kennedy's National Security Council Meeting Notes 11/15/1961 At the National Security Council (NSC) meeting where he scrawled these notes, President John F. Kennedy's advisers pressed him to dispatch 8,000 American ground troops to Vietnam. He resisted, saying he could "make a rather strong case against intervening in an area 10,000 miles away against 16,000 guerrillas with a native army of 200,000, where millions have been spent for years with no success." His notes say: Guerilla War = 10,000 Vietnam - What about Cuba - 2 Front War Diplomacy - Multi-lateral SEATO group NATO In the end, Kennedy chose to compromise, authorizing an increase in advisers and firepower. It was one of a series of escalations he would make during his term as President. Included is a copy transcribing the President's notes, made by his personal secretary, Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln. Transcript Nov. 15, 1961 The White House Washington Guerilla War = 10,000 Vietnam - What about Cuba - 2 Front War Diplomacy - Multi-lateral SEATO group NATO
36. VIET_171108_246.JPG: CINPAC Communication Exclusive for Admiral Felt and General Harkins 2/7/1962 This document gives the approval of the President and Secretary of Defense to establish the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) on February 8, 1962, at a time of increased military assistance to South Vietnam. It names General Paul D. Harkins as the commanding general of MACV, and says that this senior U.S. military commander in South Vietnam will have the direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations and assistance in that country. China and the Soviet Union saw the establishment of this joint-service command as an indication that the United States intended to send combat troops to Vietnam. The Chinese and Soviets planned to increase their support for the Communist insurgency in Vietnam in response.
37. VIET_171108_250.JPG: "Viet Cong" Army Victories Propaganda Poster ca. 1963 Inflated body counts became a contentious issue in the U.S. later in the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese Communists also focused on numbers of killed and wounded. Le Duan, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, was obsessed with them, setting ridiculously high goals for each campaign. This Communist propaganda poster celebrates army victories in 1962 and the first three months of 1963 with some questionable numbers. Below is a partial translation of the text followed by actual numbers where available. 19 million people united to struggle against "My Diem" or "America's Diem." (the population of South Vietnam in 1962 was 14,650,000) We fought 19,711 battles We killed 28,108 enemy including 222 American advisers. (10,122 ARVN and 109 Americans were killed between 1962 and the end of 1963) We wounded 26,011 enemy including 102 American advisers (18,683 ARVN and 41 Americans were wounded in 1962 between 1962 and the end of 1963) We captured 5,118 enemy including 4 Americans
38. VIET_171108_257.JPG: Diem's Downfall The South Vietnamese President's increasingly authoritarian regime ends in a violent coup
39. VIET_171108_261.JPG: State Saigon cable 243 8/24/1963 A flood of American resources from the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s appeared to buoy South Vietnam against the North Vietnam forces. But in the spring of 1963, photographs of protests against the U.S.-supported Diem regime in South Vietnam stunned observers around the world. Newspaper images of monks burning themselves to protest discriminatory treatment by the Diem regime caused international outcry. President Ngo Dinh Diem promised to enact reforms but was undermined by his brother and chief advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Protests continued and escalated when Nhu responded with violent raids on Buddhist pagodas. Violence and unrest in Saigon made Washington tense. Diem ignored the Kennedy administration's increasingly adamant calls for reform. Soon after the deadly midnight attacks on Buddhist pagodas, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge received this cable. It authorized him to offer a group of generals plotting to overthrow President Diem "direct support in any interim period of breakdown." The cable gave the generals the green light for their planned coup d'�tat. Kennedy was ambivalent about abandoning Diem, and knew it would anger members of Congress, but said they would "be madder if Vietnam goes down the drain."
40. VIET_171108_267.JPG: Transcript of Conversation Between President Diem and Ambassador Lodge 11/1/1963 In this meeting with U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South Vietnam, said "I have tried to do my duty." Lodge urged Diem to flee, but Diem responded: "I am trying to reestablish order." Later that day, Diem was overthrown by a group of generals in a coup d'�tat. They received the green light for their plan from the Kennedy Administration via Ambassador Lodge. Kennedy was ambivalent about abandoning Diem, and knew it would anger members of Congress, but said they would "be madder if Vietnam goes down the drain." A flood of American resources from the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s had appeared to buoy South Vietnam against the North Vietnam forces. But in the spring of 1963, photographs of protests against the U.S.-supported Diem regime stunned observers around the world. President Ngo Dinh Diem promised to enact reforms but was undermined by his brother and chief advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Protests continued and escalated when Nhu responded with violent raids on Buddhist pagodas. Violence and unrest in Saigon made Washington tense. Diem ignored the Kennedy administration's increasingly adamant calls for reform.
41. VIET_171108_274.JPG: Johnson Sets the Stage Congress rushes to give President Johnson war powers
42. VIET_171108_277.JPG: Flash Cable About the Attack on the USS Maddox 8/4/1964 The commander of Navy Task Group 72.1 filed this report – sent as "Flash" priority – containing a chronology of the reported second attack by the North Vietnamese on the destroyer USS Maddox while it was on Desoto Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 4th. It also details the response by the Maddox and the USS C. Turner Joy. Two days earlier – in the first Tonkin Gulf incident – North Vietnamese torpedo boats were spotted and attacked the destroyer USS Maddox. The Maddox was conducting electronic eavesdropping on North Vietnam to assist South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) commando raids on North Vietnamese targets, but that wasn't publicly known at the time. (Historians now suspect the North Vietnamese boats had set out to attack an ARVN raid in progress when it encountered the Maddox.) Then on August 4, the USS Maddox captain reported that he was "under continuous torpedo attack." But he later cabled "freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports." Defense Secretary Robert McNamara did not report the captain's doubts to President Johnson, however. (A 2002 National Security Agency report made available in 2007 confirmed the August 2 attack, but concluded the August 4 attack never happened.) Johnson portrayed confrontations between U.S. and North Vietnamese ships off the coast of North Vietnam as unprovoked aggression when he addressed Congress. With little debate, legislators passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, giving Johnson unprecedented power to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." (When contrary information surfaced, many believed Congress had been conned. It was too late.)
43. VIET_171108_283.JPG: President Lyndon B. Johnson Giving His Midnight Address on Second Gulf of Tonkin Incident 8/4/1964 This photograph shows President Lyndon B. Johnson, speaking from behind a podium in the Fish Room of the White House, reporting to the American people following renewed aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Johnson interrupted television broadcasts just before midnight on August 4 to announce American ships had been attacked twice in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin near North Vietnam. He gave no hint of some doubts he had expressed in a recorded conversation earlier that day. The following morning, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was introduced in the Senate. In his address, the President assured the country, "we still seek no wider war." By the end of the following year, 180,000 American troops were in Vietnam.
44. VIET_171108_286.JPG: President Lyndon B. Johnson Signing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 8/10/1964 This photograph shows President Johnson signing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in the White House East Room as Congressional leaders look on. Passage of the resolution gave President Johnson authority to expand the scope of U.S. involvement in Vietnam without a declaration of war.
45. VIET_171108_289.JPG: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as Introduced 8/4/1964 On the evening of August 4, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson addressed the nation in a televised speech in which he stated that U.S. ships had been attacked twice in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin near North Vietnam. The following morning, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was introduced in the Senate. Although the version shown here is the original draft resolution, the language was not amended and therefore reads the same as the final version that was signed into law August 10, 1964. When Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, they gave Johnson unprecedented power to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." There was little debate as legislators considered two incidents that had happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in the preceding days. On August 2 – the first Tonkin Gulf incident – North Vietnamese torpedo boats were spotted and attacked the destroyer USS Maddox. The Maddox was conducting electronic eavesdropping on North Vietnam to assist South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) commando raids on North Vietnamese targets, but that wasn't publicly known at the time. Historians now suspect the North Vietnamese boats had set out to attack an ARVN raid in progress when it encountered the Maddox. On August 4, the USS Maddox captain reported a second incident, that he was "under continuous torpedo attack." He later cabled "freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports," but Defense Secretary Robert McNamara did not report the captain's doubts to President Johnson. (A 2002 National Security Agency report made available in 2007 confirmed the August 2 attack, but concluded the August 4 attack never happened.) Johnson portrayed confrontations between U.S. and North Vietnamese ships off the coast of North Vietnam as unprovoked aggression when he addressed Congress. When contrary information later surfaced, many believed Congress had been conned. It was too late. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence mission in Tonkin Gulf, contradicting Johnson's denial of U.S. Navy support of such missions. The Resolution was repealed in 1971 in an attempt to curtail President Nixon's power to continue the war.
46. VIET_171108_292.JPG: Senate Roll Call Tally Sheet for Tonkin Gulf Resolution 8/7/1964 The Tonkin Gulf Resolution gave President Lyndon Johnson authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam. The joint resolution "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia" passed on August 7. Even politicians concerned about the American involvement in Vietnam backed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Like Johnson, they did not want to appear "soft on communism," especially with elections coming up in November. There are only two marks in the "nays" column: Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon and Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska voted against the resolution. In the short debate that took place before the vote, Senator Morse predicted, "within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake."
47. VIET_171108_299.JPG: Aggression From the North 4/23/1965 A 1965 policy paper titled "Aggression from the North" described the justification for America's intervention in Vietnam. It portrayed the war as an invasion by the North Vietnamese with Moscow pulling the strings. Critics insisted it was a civil war instigated by independent actors in the south. This "Aggression From the North" poster comes from a series of visual propaganda distributed by the U.S. Information Agency worldwide.
48. VIET_171108_307.JPG: Marines Come Ashore Near Da Nang Air Base 3/8/1965 In early 1965, after southern Communist forces attacked a U.S. Army airfield in South Vietnam, the Johnson administration launched Operation Rolling Thunder, a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam. The first American ground troops hit the ground soon after the bombing began. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. combat troops would eventually follow. Vietnamese officials only learned of plans to introduce American ground troops as 3,500 Marines were wading onto its shores. Bui Diem, the future South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, described the rift between the American and Vietnamese experience: "For the United States this event signaled the start of a new American land war in Asia. For the South Vietnamese it meant the presence once again of foreign soldiers on our own territory." The original caption for this photograph reads: Beach activity at Da Nang, Viet Nam, during the landing of the Marines of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
49. VIET_171108_312.JPG: Rolling Thunder 53 Strike Map 1/1967 President Lyndon B. Johnson was faced with a deteriorating situation in Vietnam after winning the 1964 Presidential election. His advisers predicted "disastrous defeat." Johnson planned a course of gradual escalation. In early 1965, after southern Communist forces attacked a U.S. Army airfield in South Vietnam, the administration had a pretext to launch Operation Rolling Thunder, a sustained bombing campaign against the north. This map shows "red zones" where bombing was prohibited by the White House. During Rolling Thunder, U.S. bombers dropped 643,000 tons of bombs between 1965 and 1968, killing approximately 52,000 Vietnamese civilians. An air campaign necessitated an air base, and an air base needed protection, so the first American boots hit the ground soon after the bombing began. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. combat troops would follow. America was at war.
50. VIET_171108_318.JPG: Episode 5 America Goes to War Johnson orders air campaign and sends first ground troops to Vietnam
51. VIET_171108_327.JPG: President Lyndon B. Johnson Meeting with Advisers about Vietnam 7/23/1965 This photograph shows, from left, Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs George Ball, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. When then Vice President Johnson spoke reverentially of Kennedy's brilliant advisers, whom he retained as President, fellow Texan Congressman Sam Rayburn said, "I'd feel a lot better if some of them had run for sheriff just once." This photograph comes from a contact sheet from the White House Photo Office (WHPO) during the Johnson administration. WHPO staff labeled this contact sheet "Meeting in Cabinet Room w/ Bundy, Ball, Rusk, McNamara, Busby & Moyers + LBJ."
52. VIET_171108_329.JPG: "Fork in the Road" Memo from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson 1/27/1965 Assistant National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told newly elected President Johnson that their current course in Vietnam could not succeed. They presented two alternatives: bring in the full force of the U.S. military or negotiate with the enemy. They knew Johnson would never consider the second but recommended both options be debated. Within a year, 175,000 American troops were in Vietnam. Negotiation was never discussed.
53. VIET_171108_333.JPG: "Compromise Solution for South Vietnam" Presented to the President 7/1/1965 Most of President Johnson's advisers pushed to expand America's military presence in Vietnam. A small number dissented. Under Secretary of State George Ball presented this argument for negotiating an end to the war. He stated: "No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign troops we deploy." That same day, the "Viet Cong" attacked the U.S. air base at Da Nang. Within weeks, Johnson had more than quadrupled the size of the force.
54. VIET_171108_344.JPG: Bombs Fall on the Truong Quang Tin Railroad Bridge 9/16/1966 This photograph shows bombs from an A-4C "Skyhawk" Bomber, of the U.S. Navy attack squadron VA-95, falling on the Truong Quang tin railroad bridge during an air strike over North Vietnam. U.S. bombers dropped 643,000 tons of bombs between 1965 and 1968 during Operation Rolling Thunder, killing approximately 52,000 Vietnamese civilians. Rolling Thunder, a sustained bombing campaign against the North Vietnamese, was part of the expansion of America's military presence in Vietnam in 1965. After southern Communist forces attacked a U.S. air base in January of that year, the Johnson administration had a pretext to launch Rolling Thunder.
55. VIET_171108_347.JPG: Episode 6 Fighting on Three Fronts Tensions between military strategy, humanitarian efforts, and antiwar activism reach crisis levels
56. VIET_171108_354.JPG: MACV Directive 88 12/16/1963 MACV, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was a joint-service command created in February 1962, at a time of increased military assistance to South Vietnam. This document, MACV Directive 88, lists 110 "assessment metrics" for counter-insurgency measures. It led to the counting of number of kills of North Vietnamese or spent shells as measures of progress of the Vietnam War. However, using body counts as the metric for success didn't tell the whole story. Nor did it keep the Communists from achieving their objectives.
57. VIET_171108_356.JPG: After-Action Report for the Battle of Dak To 12/10/1967 The Battle of Dak To was a series of engagements in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. Using body counts as the metric for success, the U.S. declared the battle a victory. But the Communists achieved their objectives: they pulled U.S. battalions away from urban areas in preparation for the massive Tet Offensive to come.
58. VIET_171108_359.JPG: State Department Telegram Text of a Letter from Ho Chi Minh to President Johnson 2/15/1967 President Johnson proposed peace talks to end the Vietnam War in February 1967. Although Ho Chi Minh had tried to initiate negotiations with the United States through third parties, he was constrained by official party policy. He wrote to President Johnson, in French, regarding the peace negotiations, and his response reflects that policy: "The Vietnamese people will never give way to force, it will never accept conversation under the clear threat of bombs."
59. VIET_171108_362.JPG: Graph of Comparitive Actual Casualties 1968 The American military strategy during the Vietnam War was based on the belief that the Communists would reach a point where the cost of war outweighed the benefits. However, there appeared to be no price North Vietnam felt was too high to pay in what they referred to as the "War of National Salvation against the Americans." In 1967 the North Vietnamese Army greatly expanded its draft eligibility for men. It has been estimated they ranged in age from 16 to 45. This chart plots casualties for U.S., GVN (Government of South Vietnam), VC ("Viet-Cong"), and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) forces in 1968, the year of the Tet Offensive.
60. VIET_171108_367.JPG: The War at Home Opposition to the war grows, diversifies and clashes with supporters in a more divided nation
61. VIET_171108_376.JPG: The March on the Pentagon 10/21/1967 In the late 1960s during the Vietnam War, antiwar protests mounted. Public support for the war fell below 50 percent for the first time. In October of 1967, 70,000 protesters marched on the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Department of Defense, to protest the war in Vietnam. This photograph shows anti-war demonstrators at the reflecting pool in Washington, DC. The stereotype persists that members of the peace movement were hippies, college students, and liberal intellectual elites. In reality, there were antiwar sentiments across the political and economic spectrum. The Johnson administration tried to tamp down dissent with news of progress, going so far as to call General Westmoreland home from the battlefield to present a glowing report to the American people. Military officers were pressured to overestimate enemy casualties and underestimate enemy strength -- a practice that would have devastating consequences for President Johnson.
62. VIET_171108_389.JPG: Letter from Mrs. Keck to President Johnson Regarding her Son's Death 5/27/1967 Mrs. Charles Keck wrote this letter to President Johnson the day she and her husband buried her son, Corporal Russell Forrest Keck. She included a photograph of him. Corporal Keck died in Vietnam on May 18, 1967. He was 20 years old. "Rusty" served as a Machine Gun Squad Leader with Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade. He was killed in action during Operation Beau Charger in Quang Tin Province on May 18, 1967. Russell was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for his "courageous actions, bold initiative, intrepid fighting spirit and sincere concern for others." President Johnson sent a reply to the Kecks. The draft of his response letter, with its layers of revised and rejected phrases, reveals his struggle to respond.
63. VIET_171108_391.JPG: Portrait of Russell Forrest Keck
64. VIET_171108_398.JPG: President Johnson's Draft Response to Mr. and Mrs. Keck Regarding their Son's Death 6/14/1967 In long letters to President Johnson, Russell Keck's parents expressed their anger and grief at losing their son. His draft reply, with its layers of revised and rejected phrases, reveals his struggle to respond. Corporal Keck died in Vietnam on May 18, 1967. He was 20 years old. "Rusty" served as a Machine Gun Squad Leader with Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/3, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade. He was killed in action during Operation Beau Charger in Quang Tin Province on May 18, 1967. Russell was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for his "courageous actions, bold initiative, intrepid fighting spirit and sincere concern for others."
65. VIET_171108_400.JPG: Pittsburgh Veterans for Peace at the March on the Pentagon 10/21/1967 Before it was a group, "Vietnam Veterans Against the War" was a slogan on a sign carried at the April 15, 1967 Spring Mobilization to End the War in New York City. Those protesters were soon joined by others. Angered by their treatment and confused about the purpose of the war, many Vietnam veterans risked court-martial through acts of resistance. On October 21, 1967, an estimated crowd of 70,000–100,000 demonstrators gathered by the Lincoln Memorial in Washington to protest the Vietnam War and march on the Pentagon in the first major national protest against the war. In addition to the signs, chants, and other hallmarks of an anti-war demonstration, activists distributed daisies, and additionally planned to levitate the Pentagon off its foundation in an act of political theater. By the end of the protest, over 600 protesters had been jailed, and dozens hospitalized. The stereotype persists that members of the peace movement were hippies, college students, and liberal intellectual elites. In reality, there were antiwar sentiments across the political and economic spectrum.
66. VIET_171108_405.JPG: Episode 7 Tet Offensive Americans lose faith in the potential for victory after wide-ranging Communist attacks
67. VIET_171108_408.JPG: Map of Saigon Defense of the U.S. Embassy 1/31/1968 On January 30, 1968, a team of Vietcong blew a hole in the wall of the U.S. Embassy compound in Saigon, South Vietnam. Part of the larger Tet Offensive, this battle lasted longer than six hours and ended with all 19 intruders killed or wounded. The attack shook American confidence in the prosecution of the war. This map reflects the defense efforts implemented for the American Embassy in Saigon after the attack.
68. VIET_171108_413.JPG: Page from General Westmoreland's National Press Club Address 11/1967 During the Johnson administration, public support for the Vietnam War fell below 50 percent for the first time. In October 1967, nearly 100,000 people joined the March on the Pentagon to protest the war. The Johnson administration tried to tamp down dissent with news of progress, going so far as to call General William Westmoreland home from the battlefield to project optimism to the American people at the end of 1967. It was the first time a theater commander had been called home from the battlefield. As shown on this page, the general told a group of journalists: "I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing." Also in his speech, he said "we have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." However, after the Tet Offensive in early 1968, President Johnson lost credibility in the eyes of many Americans. In January, South Vietnamese and American troops were caught off guard by 70,000 Communist troops who struck more than 100 towns and cities with swift and stunning ferocity. A second wave of fighting took place in late April, and a third in August. Although the enemy suffered devastating casualties and their attempt to spark a general uprising completely failed, many Americans concluded the U.S. and its allies had suffered a massive defeat. When a Defense Department report regarding the need for 205,000 more American troops was leaked to the New York Times, Americans concluded the war was stalemated and the Johnson administration had lied to them.
69. VIET_171108_416.JPG: National Press Club Reporter's Question for General Westmoreland 11/21/1967 During the Johnson administration, public support for the Vietnam War fell below 50 percent for the first time. In October 1967, nearly 100,000 people joined the March on the Pentagon to protest the war. The Johnson administration tried to tamp down dissent with news of progress, going so far as to call General William Westmoreland home from the battlefield to project optimism to the American people at the end of 1967. It was the first time a theater commander had been called home from the battlefield. The general told a group of journalists, "we have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." This is one of the questions asked of him by a reporter: "None of the 'phases' you outline mentions surrender by North Vietnam. What is the significance of this omission?"
70. VIET_171108_419.JPG: CIA Analysis of the Tet Offensive 2/12/1968 This CIA analyst surmised that the Tet attacks were a military failure but a psychological victory for the Vietnamese Communists. The report calls it "an inauspicious beginning for the Year of the Monkey." On January 31, 1968, the South Vietnamese had been looking forward to Tet, a celebration of the lunar new year. They were caught off guard when 70,000 Communist troops struck more than 100 towns and cities with swift and stunning ferocity. Most of the fighting was over in a few days, but a second wave came in late April and a third in August. Although the enemy suffered devastating casualties and their attempt to spark a general uprising completely failed, many Americans concluded the U.S. and its allies had suffered a massive defeat. When a Defense Department report regarding the need for 205,000 more American troops was leaked to the New York Times, Americans concluded the war was stalemated and the Johnson administration had lied to them.
71. VIET_171108_429.JPG: Memo from Walt W. Rostow to President Johnson 1/30/1968 Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow notified President Lyndon B. Johnson of the breach of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Nineteen Vietcong invaders gained access by blowing a hole in its wall. The resulting six-hour battle ended when all of the intruders were either killed or wounded. One Marine and four American military police were killed defending the embassy. This was the beginning of the first phase of the Tet Offensive assault, when 70,000 Communist troops struck more than 100 towns and cities with swift and stunning ferocity. Most of the fighting was over in a few days, but a second wave came in late April and a third in August. Although the North Vietnamese suffered devastating casualties and their attempt to spark a general uprising failed, many Americans concluded the U.S. and its allies had suffered a massive defeat. When a Defense Department report regarding the need for 205,000 more American troops was leaked to the New York Times, Americans concluded the war was stalemated and the Johnson administration had lied to them.
72. VIET_171108_431.JPG: Soldiers at Hue City 2/6/1968 During the North Vietnamese Army's surprise 1968 Tet Offensive, a fierce battle raged in the city of Hue. North Vietnamese Army troops and Vietcong attacked South Vietnamese Army troops and U.S. Marines. The month-long battle destroyed the city and ended in defeat for the attackers. This photograph from February 6, 1968, shows D.R. Howe treating the wounds of Private First Class D.A. Crum. The original caption reads: Twentieth Century "Angel of Mercy" -- D. R. Howe (Glencoe, MN) treats the wounds of Private First Class D. A. Crum (New Brighton, PA), "H" Company, 2nd Battalion, Fifth Marine Regiment, during Operation Hue City.
73. VIET_171108_433.JPG: Hue City Officials Arrange Massacre Victims' Coffins 1969 During the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War, People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Viet Cong forces infiltrated Hue city. The communist troops rounded up and executed some 2,800 civilians. After two months of battle, their remains began to be discovered in multiple mass graves.
74. VIET_171108_438.JPG: General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executive a "Viet Cong" prisoner in Saigon, February 1, 1968
75. VIET_171108_442.JPG: His Greatest Sorrow
76. VIET_171108_446.JPG: "Withdrawal Speech" by President Johnson 3/31/1968 The first drafts of this March speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson emphasized winning the war in Vietnam. An alternate version emphasized ending the war -- Johnson chose that one. He called for a halt to bombing, greater reliance on the South Vietnamese, and a modest troop increase. In April, North Vietnam agreed to open peace talks. Shown on this page, Johnson shocked even his closest advisers when he announced his decision not to run for a second term as President: "I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President." This draft includes corrections in the President's handwriting.
77. VIET_171108_453.JPG: Episode 6 Fighting on Three Fronts
78. VIET_171108_454.JPG: Episode 8 Nixon's Campaign Promise Interference with Johnson's peace talks before the election; expanded war after it
79. VIET_171108_458.JPG: "Salted Peanuts" Memo from Secretary Kissinger to President Nixon 9/10/1969 Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger thought President Nixon's plan of "Vietnamization" (increasingly turning the war over to the South Vietnamese) made no sense. How could he put pressure on Hanoi when the United States was pulling out troops? After Nixon committed to this course of action, Kissinger sent this memo complaining, "withdrawal of U.S. troops will become like 'salted peanuts' to the American public: The more U.S. troops come home the more will be demanded."
80. VIET_171108_461.JPG: Silent Majority Speech Reading Copy 11/3/1969 During the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon's presidential campaign led many to conclude he had a "secret plan to end the war." Some historians believe he was actually determined to win the war. Others say he planned a negotiated withdrawal from the beginning. We do know he had a secret. He sabotaged President Johnson's peace talks to prevent an agreement from threatening his election. To counter protests against his failure to make significant progress toward his campaign promise, Nixon gave what has become known as the "Silent Majority" speech. He announced his plans for "Vietnamization" (increasingly turning the war over to the South Vietnamese) and portrayed dissenters as the noisy, unpatriotic few. He then asked "the great silent majority of [his] fellow Americans" for their support. He got it. According to a Gallup poll, the speech catapulted his approval rating from around 50 percent to 77 percent. The war continued for four years under Nixon. During that time, 21,041 Americans and over two million Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians were killed.
81. VIET_171108_465.JPG: Haldeman's notes, October 22, 1968 On the night of October 22, 1968, according to the notes of H.R. Haldeman, Richard Nixon's closest aide, Nixon told him to tell John Mitchell to "Keep Anne Chennault working on SVN" and to asked Bryce Hollow is there was "any other way to monkey wrench" LBJ's efforts to enter peace talks with both Vietnam regimes.
82. VIET_171108_469.JPG: Episode 9: Crossing into Cambodia: Nixon's Cambodian campaign fans antiwar flames and deepens divide between Americans
83. VIET_171108_473.JPG: Campus Scene, Kent State University (OH) 5/4/1970 In the midst of Vietnam War, President Nixon had decided to initiate the Cambodian campaign. This apparent expansion of the Vietnam War detonated an explosion of antiwar activity that escalated to a national crisis when four students were shot at a protest at Kent State University in Ohio. Students had been protesting for days when the town mayor declared a state of emergency and called in the National Guard to help reestablish order. There were over 1,300 armed troops, armored personnel carriers, mortar launchers, and helicopters on the Kent State University campus on May 4, 1970. Ohio National Guard troops opened fire on unarmed students. In a period of 13 seconds, 67 shots were fired, wounding nine -- one paralyzed for life -- and killing four students. Two of the slain victims were not protesters; they were walking to class. One was a member of the ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps) who was planning to go into the military. News of the shootings rocked the nation. Many were outraged, but according to a Gallup Poll, 58 percent of Americans blamed the students for the violence at Kent State. Dean Kahler, who was shot and paralyzed during the attack, opened a letter when he came out of an induced coma. It began, "Dear communist hippie radical, I hope by the time you read this, you are dead." In response to the shootings President Nixon said, "When dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy." Others were horrified and erupted in protest. An estimated four million striking students shut down 800 campuses nationwide. President Nixon created the President's Commission on Campus Unrest to investigate protest at schools across the country. It concluded that "the indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted and inexcusable." A federal grand jury indicted eight guardsmen, but found they were not subject to criminal prosecution because they acted in self defense.
84. VIET_171108_478.JPG: Mary Ann Vecchio with Kent State shooting victim Jeffrey Miller, May 4, 1970
85. VIET_171108_482.JPG: Letter from LeRoy M. Satrom 5/2/1970 In the midst of Vietnam War, President Nixon had decided to initiate the Cambodian campaign. This apparent expansion of the Vietnam War detonated an explosion of antiwar activity that escalated to a national crisis when four students were shot at a protest at Kent State University in Ohio. Students protesting the Cambodian incursion had been unruly and violent for days when the town mayor, LeRoy M. Satrom, declared a state of emergency and sent this letter requesting troops from the Ohio National Guard to help reestablish order. There were over 1,300 armed troops, armored personnel carriers, mortar launchers, and helicopters on the Kent State University campus on May 4, 1970. Ohio National Guard troops opened fire on unarmed students. Nine were wounded -- one paralyzed for life -- and four were killed.
86. VIET_171108_487.JPG: National Security Decision Memorandum 57: Actions to Protect U.S. Forces in South Vietnam 4/26/1970 This is President Richard Nixon's directive to send U.S. and South Vietnamese ground forces into Cambodia. The Vietnamese Communists had long used neutral Cambodia as a place to regroup and store weapons. President Nixon planned to send ground groups to attack Communist sanctuaries and central headquarters. One historical interpretation of Nixon's strategy is that he hoped to destabilize the enemy in order to provide a "decent interval" in which South Vietnam could fend for itself while American troops pulled out. It decision outraged many Americans. This apparent expansion of the war detonated an explosion of antiwar activity that escalated to a national crisis when four students were shot at a protest at Kent State University in Ohio. The public was unaware that Nixon had been secretly bombing Cambodia since mid-March 1969 -- an escalation of a covert bombing campaign started by Johnson in 1965.
87. VIET_171108_493.JPG: Map of Kent State University Shootings 5/4/1970 This map, prepared for the Commission on Campus Unrest, shows the "the Commons" area on the Kent State Campus, the movement of the National Guardsmen, and the locations where students were shot. In the midst of Vietnam War, President Nixon had decided to initiate the Cambodian campaign. This apparent expansion of the Vietnam War detonated an explosion of antiwar activity that escalated to a national crisis when four students were shot at a protest at Kent State University in Ohio. The public was unaware that Nixon had been secretly bombing Cambodia since mid-March 1969 -- an escalation of a covert bombing campaign started by Johnson in 1965. Students had been protesting for days when the town mayor declared a state of emergency and called in the National Guard to help reestablish order. Ohio National Guard troops opened fire on unarmed students. Nine were wounded -- one paralyzed for life -- and four were killed. Nixon created the President's Commission on Campus Unrest to investigate protests at schools across the country. It concluded that "the indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted and inexcusable." A federal grand jury indicted eight guardsmen, but found they were not subject to criminal prosecution because they acted in self defense.
88. VIET_171108_501.JPG: Campus Scene During Shootings at Kent State University 5/4/1970 In the midst of Vietnam War, President Nixon had decided to initiate the Cambodian campaign. This apparent expansion of the Vietnam War detonated an explosion of antiwar activity that escalated to a national crisis when four students were shot at a protest at Kent State University in Ohio. Students protesting the Cambodian incursion had been unruly and violent for days. The town mayor declared a state of emergency and called in the National Guard to help him reestablish order. There were over 1,300 armed troops, armored personnel carriers, mortar launchers, and helicopters on the Kent State University campus on May 4, 1970. Ohio National Guard troops opened fire on unarmed students. In a period of 13 seconds, 67 shots were fired, wounding nine -- one paralyzed for life -- and killing four students. Two of the slain victims were not protesters; they were walking to class. One was a member of the ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps) who was planning to go into the military. News of the shootings rocked the nation. Many were outraged, but the outrage took different forms. According to a Gallup Poll, 58 percent of Americans blamed the students for the violence at Kent State. Dean Kahler, who was shot and paralyzed during the attack, opened a letter when he came out of an induced coma. It began, "Dear communist hippie radical, I hope by the time you read this, you are dead." President Nixon appeared to agree. In response to the shootings he said, "When dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy." Others were horrified and erupted in protest. An estimated four million striking students shut down 800 campuses nationwide. President Nixon created the President's Commission on Campus Unrest to investigate protest at schools across the country. It concluded that "the indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted and inexcusable." A federal grand jury indicted eight guardsmen, but found they were not subject to criminal prosecution because they acted in self defense.
89. VIET_171108_505.JPG: Hard Hat Presented to President Nixon after Kent State Riots 5/8/1970 In April 1970, President Richard Nixon announced his plan to send ground groups to Cambodia to attack Communist sanctuaries and central headquarters. This apparent expansion of the Vietnam War detonated an explosion of antiwar activity. The public was still unaware that Nixon had been secretly bombing Cambodia since mid-March 1969 -- an escalation of a covert bombing campaign started by Johnson in 1965. Antiwar activity escalated to a national crisis when the National Guard was called in and four students were shot at a protest at Kent State University in Ohio. News of the shootings rocked the nation. Many were outraged, but the outrage took different forms. According to a Gallup Poll, 58 percent of Americans blamed the students for the violence at Kent State. President Nixon appeared to agree. In response to the shootings he said, "When dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy." New York City Mayor John Lindsay flew the American flag at half mast after the Kent State shootings. Construction workers protested his decision by rioting in the city on May 7 and 8. A bystander remarked that he could feel the polarization. Nixon later thanked rioters for their public demonstration of support. This hat was presented to President Nixon.
90. VIET_171108_510.JPG: "Napalm Girl," June 8, 1972
91. VIET_171108_514.JPG: "X" Envelope to be Opened by the Director of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library 6/26/1973 Richard Nixon's presidential campaign led many to conclude he had a secret plan to end the Vietnam war. Some historians believe he was actually determined to win the war. Others say he planned a negotiated withdrawal from the beginning. We do know he had a secret. He sabotaged Johnson's peace talks to prevent an agreement from threatening his election. Acting on a tip, President Johnson ordered an FBI wiretap on South Vietnamese Embassy phones. This confirmed that Nixon was indeed interfering with the peace talks. Nixon had sent an emissary to tell President Thieu of South Vietnam not to sign the peace agreement that President Johnson was currently negotiating. When Nixon became President, he negotiated a peace deal that left Thieu in a more powerful position. When he left the White House, Johnson instructed his National Security Adviser Walt Rostow to take the files related to Nixon's interference with the peace talks. In 1973 Rostow gave them to the Johnson Presidential Library with instructions not to open them for 50 years. However, they were opened in 1994, and most of the documents have since been declassified. Johnson never went public with Nixon's meddling, believing it would have thrown the country into turmoil.
92. VIET_171108_518.JPG: FBI Cable from Walt Rostow to Richard Nixon Regarding Anna Chennault 11/2/1968 Nixon's presidential campaign led many to conclude he had a secret plan to end the Vietnam war. Some historians believe he was actually determined to win the war. Others say he planned a negotiated withdrawal from the beginning. We do know he had a secret. He sabotaged Johnson's peace talks to prevent an agreement from threatening his election. Acting on a tip, President Johnson ordered an FBI wiretap on South Vietnamese Embassy phones. This cable confirmed that Nixon was indeed interfering with the peace talks. Nixon had sent an emissary, Anna Chennault, to tell President of South Vietnam Thieu, "Hold on, we are gonna win." The implication was clear: Thieu should not sign the peace agreement President Johnson was currently negotiating. When Nixon became President, he would negotiate a peace deal that left Thieu in a more powerful position.
93. VIET_171108_520.JPG: Episode 10 Fighting While Talking The North Vietnamese "Spring Offensive" and the American "Christmas Bombing"
94. VIET_171108_530.JPG: Page of President Thieu's notes from meeting with Henry Kissinger, October 22, 1972
95. VIET_171108_535.JPG: Text of Letter from President Nixon to President Thieu 12/17/1972 National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had began backchannel negotiations with North Vietnam in February 1970 to try to end the Vietnam War. Hoping to gain an edge in these deliberations, North Vietnam attacked South Vietnam in March 1972. President Nixon was enraged by this "Spring Offensive" and retaliated by bombing. In October 1972, a defeated North Vietnam made concessions and Kissinger announced "peace is at hand." But South Vietnamese President Thieu balked at the agreement and demanded changes. When Kissinger attempted to renegotiate, the talks collapsed. Nixon blamed North Vietnam and ordered a massive "Christmas Bombing" to bring both sides back to the table. In this letter to Thieu, President Richard Nixon describes two motives for his December "Christmas Bombing," which would take place the next day, December 18, 1972. He wants to quickly end the conflict, and to demonstrate how he would respond if the peace agreement were violated. Nixon was trying to convince a reluctant Thieu to sign the agreement by showing his commitment to South Vietnam.
96. VIET_171108_541.JPG: Memo from Nixon to Kissinger, January 3, 1972 "K. We have had 10 years of total control of the air in Laos and V.Nam. The result = Zilch."
97. VIET_171108_545.JPG: "Telcon" between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger 4/15/1972 President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were each secretly recording their conversations. Kissinger's tapes were transcribed. The National Security Archive published these "telcons" in 2008, after legal proceedings and Freedom of Information Act requests made them public. In this "telcon," Nixon and Kissinger revel in the destruction caused by the recent bombing campaign: "...we can bomb the bejesus out of them..." The United States had resumed bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong on April 16, 1972. Henry Kissinger had begun backchannel negotiations with North Vietnam. Hoping to gain an edge in these deliberations, North Vietnam sent 122,000 main force units to attack South Vietnam in March 1972. Nixon was enraged by the "Spring Offensive." It threatened his reelection and his budding relationship with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, whom he hoped might abandon North Vietnam for the promise of improved American relations. In a recorded conversation, he told Kissinger he would retaliate by bombing "the bastards like [they'd] never been bombed before."
98. VIET_171108_548.JPG: President Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai toast at a state dinner in Beijing, February 25, 1972
99. VIET_171108_550.JPG: Memorandum of Conversation at the Paris Peace Talks 12/6/1972 National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had began backchannel negotiations with North Vietnam in February 1970 to try to end the Vietnam War. Hoping to gain an edge in these deliberations, North Vietnam sent 122,000 main force units to attack South Vietnam in March 1972. President Nixon was enraged by this "Spring Offensive." In a recorded conversation, he told Kissinger he would retaliate by bombing "the bastards like [they'd] never been bombed before." In October 1972, a defeated North Vietnam made concessions and Kissinger announced "peace is at hand." In this conversation with North Vietnamese representatives from Hanoi, Kissinger succinctly stated the Nixon administration's goals: "We will not give Saigon [South Vietnam] a guarantee of victory. But neither can we make an agreement which gives your side a guarantee of victory. What we want is an agreement which gives the real political forces in Vietnam an opportunity...to develop, so that the Vietnamese people...can determine their destiny." But South Vietnamese President Thieu balked at the agreement and demanded changes. When Kissinger attempted to renegotiate, the talks collapsed. Nixon blamed North Vietnam and ordered a massive "Christmas Bombing" to bring both sides back to the table.
100. VIET_171108_557.JPG: Episode 11 Paris Peace Accords Peace is declared but not achieved
101. VIET_171108_571.JPG: CIA Model of "Hanoi Hilton" ca. 1972 The CIA sometimes produced models for prisoner of war rescue missions. These miniatures helped operational planners to understand the target, in this case, the Hoa Lo prison camp. Built by the French in the 1880s to house political prisoners, the Americans held there during the Vietnam War -- including Lieutenant Commander (later Senator) John McCain -- called it the "Hanoi Hilton." Despite attempts, no American POW successfully escaped or was rescued from a North Vietnam prison.
102. VIET_171108_575.JPG: Secretary of State William Rogers Signing the Vietnam Peace Agreements 1/27/1973 Vietnam Peace Talks with POW Pictures.On January 27, 1973, the Paris Peace Accords officially ended the war in Vietnam. South Vietnamese President Thieu reluctantly signed after President Nixon secretly promised "swift and severe retaliatory action" if North Vietnam violated it. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared they had achieved "peace with honor" and hoped it would last long enough to give Saigon (South Vietnam) a fighting chance. In fact the war was far from over. Fighting between Saigon and Hanoi (North Vietnam) continued and even increased in parts of South Vietnam. North Vietnam began preparations to overtake the South. President Nixon, embroiled in the Watergate scandal, did not have the political capital to provide the backup he had promised.
103. VIET_171108_577.JPG: Paris Peace Accords 1/27/1973 This is the "Agreement Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-nam." The first pages and signatures are shown here. On January 27, 1973, the Paris Peace Accords officially ended the war in Vietnam. South Vietnamese President Thieu reluctantly signed after President Nixon secretly promised "swift and severe retaliatory action" against North Vietnam if they violated the agreement. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger declared they had achieved "peace with honor" and hoped it would last long enough to give Saigon a fighting chance. In fact the war was far from over. Fighting between Saigon and Hanoi continued and even increased in parts of South Vietnam. North Vietnam began preparations to overtake the South. President Nixon, embroiled in the Watergate scandal, did not have the political capital to provide the backup he had repeatedly promised his ally, President Thieu.
104. VIET_171108_582.JPG: Hanoi Hilton Brick
105. VIET_171108_583.JPG: Receipt for Captain Robert White 4/1/1973 Captain Robert White was the last American prisoner of war released after the Vietnam War. "They just plain forgot about me," said Captain White, who was the prisoner of a "Viet Cong" who was hiding in a swamp in the Mekong Delta at the end of the war. American officials were surprised when he was turned over a few days after the "last" surviving American POWs were released.
106. VIET_171108_588.JPG: Telegram from Haig to Kissinger regarding insights on the Indochina situation, April 1, 1973
107. VIET_171108_592.JPG: Telephone Conversation Between Melvin Laird and Henry Kissinger 6/26/1973 The Watergate scandal destroyed President Nixon's political capital. He was therefore unable to fight mounting congressional efforts to cut off funding for the Vietnam War. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Melvin Laird, a counselor to the President, lamented the situation during this telephone conversation.
108. VIET_171108_595.JPG: Adandoned combat boots by ARVN soldiers, April 30, 1975
109. VIET_171108_599.JPG: Shoes from a Child Transported During Operation Babylift 1975 In April 1975, the North Vietnamese captured Saigon, taking control of South Vietnam and marking the end of the Vietnam War, two years after the Paris Peace Agreement and the last American troops left Vietnam. During the chaotic final days before the fall of Saigon, President Gerald Ford ordered the evacuation of Vietnamese orphans. The plan was controversial. There were questions about the administration's political motives and whether the children would be better off in America, especially when it was discovered that some of the children weren't truly orphans. There were rumors that the Communists would kill Amerasian children, so some desperate parents chose to send their children away to save them. The mission, officially named Operation Babylift, began April 3, 1975. Tragically, the first flight's plane malfunctioned, causing the pilot to have to make a crash landing and killing 78 children and 50 adults. More than 170 survived. In all, more than 3,300 children were evacuated to the United States.
110. VIET_171108_602.JPG: National Security Agency intercepts of helicopter radio messages, April 29, 1975
111. VIET_171108_606.JPG: Helicopter Pilot Radio Transmissions During the Saigon Evacuation 4/29/1975 These National Security Agency intercepts captured communications from rescue helicopters as they wove in and out of artillery fire and dodged gas bombs to rescue Vietnamese refugees and American personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, South Vietnam. The helicopters were part of Operation Frequent Wind, put in motion because Saigon's airport was under rocket fire. This emergency measure used scores of helicopters to ferry 7,000 evacuees directly from the American Embassy and other rally sites to ships in the China Sea in less than 24 hours. The final trip rescued 11 stranded U.S. Marines who had spent the night on the embassy roof. After the Paris Peace Agreement to end the Vietnam War was signed in 1973, the Communists had continued to infiltrate South Vietnam. The 1973 Case-Church Amendment prohibited U.S. military activity in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia without congressional approval. The United States continued to supply its ally, South Vietnam, with some military equipment and arms. North Vietnamese Army forces attacked major cities in the highlands in March 1975. The South Vietnamese Army crumbled. A frenzied, last-minute evacuation of American civilians and South Vietnamese citizens at risk of retaliation by the communists ended just hours before a North Vietnamese Army tank crashed the Imperial Palace gates.
112. VIET_171108_614.JPG: "Fleeing for Liberty" 1975 In the years that followed the fall of Saigon and the North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam, 1.6 million Vietnamese refugees fled the Communist regime. President Ford signed the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act on May 23, 1975, facilitating the settlement of 130,000 Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian refugees in the United States. One of them, Loc Huu Nguyen, dedicated this painting of his experience to President and Mrs. Ford.
113. VIET_171108_619.JPG: Telegram from Ambassador Martin Concerning the Evacuation of Saigon 4/29/1975 Ambassador Graham Martin sent this telegram to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, at the White House, during the evacuation of Saigon during the Vietnam War. He states that he is "well aware of the danger here tomorrow and I want to get out tonight." He asks that the President send an order to finish the job quickly, evacuating the rest of the Americans and their children. The American Ambassador to Vietnam resisted limiting the evacuation to Americans. In this cable he asks with evident desperation, "Perhaps you can tell me how to make some of these Americans abandon their half Vietnamese children?" Before sunrise on April 30, the Ambassador was forced to leave while a few hundred Vietnamese still awaited rescue.
114. VIET_171108_624.JPG: Fall of Saigon The Communists conquer South Vietnam
115. VIET_171108_638.JPG: Aftermath Vietnam Veterans Memorial A memorial for veterans, healing for the nation
116. VIET_171108_641.JPG: Vietnam Veteran's Memorial proposal by Maya Lin, 1981
117. VIET_171108_643.JPG: Items Left at the Wall
118. VIET_171108_651.JPG: Vietnam War Memorial Statue in Westminster, California
119. VIET_171108_660.JPG: Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, May 23, 1975
120. VIET_171108_667.JPG: Eyewitness statement of Lawrence's co-pilot Paul Zabrieskie, October 16, 1971
121. VIET_171108_670.JPG: Department of the Army General Orders Number 873, May 1, 1972
122. VIET_171108_674.JPG: Aftermath Veterans' Records at the National Archives
123. VIET_171108_682.JPG: President Clinton's announcement of normalization of relations with Vietnam, July 11, 1995
124. VIET_171108_685.JPG: Gift to President William J. Clinton from His Excellency Phan Van Khai, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, undated
125. VIET_171108_700.JPG: Bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail Airstrikes December 4, 1969
126. VIET_171108_709.JPG: Bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail Airstrikes December 20, 1972
127. VIET_171108_756.JPG: Bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail Airstrikes November 29, 1965
128. VIET_171108_758.JPG: Bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail Airstrikes December 9, 1965
129. VIET_171108_767.JPG: "It seems now more certain than ever, that the bloody experience in Vietnam is to end in a stalemate." -- Anchorman Walter Cronkite, 1968
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